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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from a civil action for group insurance 
benefits, tort damages and attorneys' fees resulting from a denial 
of a health insurance claim. 
Jurisdiction of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah 
County, from which this appeal arises is based on UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-3-4(1) (1953, as amended). 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Article VIII, Section 5 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j) 
(1953, as amended) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This case has been certified by the Utah Court of 
Appeals to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 43 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Judgment of the Trial Court was entered on September 5, 1990 
and Appellants' Notice of Appeal was filed with the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Utah County, on September 18, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court properly grant Gem Insurance 
Company's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the Robertsons' 
causes of action sounding in tort and breach of contract are pre-
empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act? Gem has set 
forth specifically the standard of appellate review for this issue 
on page 11 of this Brief. 
1 
2. Did the Trial Court properly limit the Robertsons1 award 
of attorneys1 fees solely to those issues upon which they 
prevailed? Gem has set forth specifically the standard of 
appellate review for this issue on pages 12-13 of this Brief. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1001, et seq. ("ERISA") . The relevant provisions of ERISA are 
attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After injuring her neck shovelling snow on Christmas Day 1988, 
and subsequently being treated by a doctor, appellant, Jackie 
Robertson, submitted claims for that treatment to Gem Insurance 
Company ("Gem") . Gem, relying on statements made by her to her 
physician and reflected in his records, denied coverage, alleging 
that Jackie Robertson's injury was the result of a pre-existing 
condition. On or about July 20, 1989, the Robertsons initiated 
suit for wrongful denial of insurance claims in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Utah County, State of Utah. In their Complaint the 
Robertsons alleged that Gem intentionally made false or misleading 
representations concerning policy benefits, knowing that such 
representations would result in the infliction of emotional 
distress; breached the terms of the insurance policy; and breached 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not promptly 
and properly investigating the Robertsons' claims and by not 
providing payment under the policy. The Robertsons further claimed 
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that as a direct and proximate result of Gem's conduct, they 
suffered a monetary loss in the amount of the policy benefits 
wrongfully denied, and additional damages including credit 
disparagement, attorneys' fees, and unspecified out-of-pocket 
expenses. Finally, the Robertsons claimed that Gem exhibited a 
willful disregard for their rights, peace of mind and emotional 
well being, necessitating punitive damages. 
On September 11, 1989, Gem filed a Motion to Dismiss on the 
basis that ERISA governed the case at bar and therefore pre-empted 
Utah State common law and statutory causes of action allowing for 
claims such as breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive 
damages. On November 6, 1989, after oral argument, the Lower Court 
granted Gem's Motion to Dismiss, thereby holding over for trial the 
issues of the Robertsons' claims for policy benefits and attorneys' 
fees. At trial the Lower Court found for the Robertsons and 
against Gem, awarding judgment in the amount of $8,092.46 together 
with interest at the legal rate of 10% per annum from May 1, 1989. 
In addition, the Lower Court awarded reasonable attorneys' fees to 
the Robertsons of $4,192.50. 
On or about September 6, 1990, Gem delivered to the Robertsons 
a check in the amount of $13,764.22 in full payment of the judgment 
entered against Gem. The Robertsons acknowledged satisfaction of 
Gem's payment of the judgment, which Satisfaction of Judgment was 
filed on or about September 11, 1990. On September 18, 1990, the 
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Robertsons filed their Notice of Appeal with the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, appealing the Lower 
Courtfs ruling for Gem on its Motion to Dismiss and the amount of 
the Lower Court's award of attorneys1 fees to the Robertsons. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about October 26, 1988, Mountain States Steel ("Mountain 
States") , Craig Robertson's employer, applied for membership in the 
Intermountain Employers Trust ("IMET"), a multi-employer trust 
which had contracted for group health insurance with Gem, for the 
purpose of allowing it to acquire a group health insurance policy, 
which low cost coverage it could then provide to its employees. 
(See, Statement of Facts in Gem's Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion to Dismiss, R. 35). Mountain States was accepted by IMET 
on November 1, 1988. R. 36. A true and accurate copy of Mountain 
States' Trust Subscription Agreement and Application is attached 
hereto as Addendum B. 
Craig Robertson and his dependent and wife Jackie Robertson 
became beneficiaries under the Gem policy of insurance effective 
November 1, 1988. R. 36. 
On or about December 25, 1988, Jackie Robertson injured her 
neck. Jackie Robertson submitted claims for medical care she 
received to Gem. Plaintiffs' Complaint R. 1, 2; Memorandum 
Decision, R. 239. 
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Gem denied Jackie Robertson's claims on the basis that such 
injury was as a result of a pre-existing condition. Plaintiffs' 
Complaint R. 2, 3; Memorandum Decision, R. 239. 
On or about July 20, 1989, the Robertsons brought suit against 
Gem, alleging intentional misrepresentations of policy benefits, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of the 
insurance policy, and breach of the implied contractual covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. The Robertsons claimed damages of 
the policy benefits allegedly wrongfully denied, credit 
disparagement, attorneys' fees, and unspecified out-of-pocket 
expenses. The Robertsons also sought punitive damages. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, R. 1-4. 
On September 11, 1989, Gem filed a Motion to Dismiss all of 
the Robertsons' claims except wrongful denial of insurance benefits 
on the basis that ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. , governed the 
Robertsons' claims and thereby preempted Utah common law and 
statutory causes of action concerning their claims for breach of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. R. 35. 
Written memoranda were filed by both parties. At oral argument, 
the Robertsons conceded that Mountain States' involvement with Gem 
included a full contribution to the premium for its employees and 
payroll deductions for employees' dependents' premiums. See, Brief 
of Appellants, page 8, fn. 3. Following oral argument, the Lower 
Court held that the Robertsons' causes of action other than 
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wrongful denial of insurance benefits were pre-empted by ERISA and 
dismissed all causes of action with the exception of that for 
benefits under the policy and reasonable attorneys1 fees. R. 84, 
85. 
A non-jury trial was held on June 25, 1990, regarding the 
issues of policy benefits and attorneys1 fees. On September 5, 
199 0, the Lower Court entered judgment in favor of the Robertsons 
in the amount of $8,092.46, together with interest at the legal 
rate of 10% per annum from May 1, 1989. The Lower Court found that 
policy benefits had been wrongfully denied to Jackie Robertson and 
that the Robertsons were entitled to costs and reasonable 
attorneys1 fees on the issue of benefits under the policy. The 
Lower Court affixed the reasonable attorneys1 fees at $4,192.50. 
This figure represented the total time expended by the Robertsons1 
counsel (92.5 hours), less 28 hours expended by the Robertsons1 
counsel unsuccessfully opposing Gem's Motion to Dismiss, for a 
total of 64.5 hours. The Lower Court multiplied 64.5 hours times 
the prevailing hourly rate in the Provo, Utah area of $65.00 per 
hour to arrive at the figure of $4,192.50. In reaching this 
decision the Lower Court relied on the Utah Court of Appeals' 
decision in Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 776 P. 2d 643 
(Utah App. 1989). R. 252-258. 
On or about September 6, 1990, Gem delivered to the 
Robertsons' counsel a check in the amount of $13,764.22, in full 
payment of the judgment entered against Gem. On September 11, 
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199 0, the Robertsons acknowledged satisfaction of Gem's payment of 
the judgment in the amount of $13,764.22, which Satisfaction of 
Judgment was filed with the Fourth Judicial District Court. R. 
260, 261. See also, August 31 and September 4 & 6, 1990 letters 
from Jeffrey R. Oritt to Jeffery Peatross, true and correct copies 
of which are attached hereto as Addendum C. 
On September 18, 1990, the Robertsons filed their Notice of 
Appeal with the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State 
of Utah. Notice for Appeal, R. 262. 
Previously, Gem terminated its agreement to provide insurance 
to Mountain States due to the fact that Mountain States' employee 
participation in the group health insurance had dropped below the 
required level of 60% participation. The termination was effective 
July 1, 1989. See, letter dated July 17, 1989 from Carolyn Ivie 
to Mountain States, a true and accurate copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum D. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Robertsons' appeal involves two distinct issues. The 
first issue is whether the Lower Court erred in granting Gem's 
Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Robertsons' state law 
claims are pre-empted by ERISA, for which the standard of review 
is to view facts alleged in the Robertsons1 Complaint in a light 
most favorable to them and affirm the dismissal if it is apparent 
that as a matter of law the Robertsons could not have recovered 
under the facts alleged. The second issue is the Lower Court's 
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failure to award them attorneys1 fees incurred for the issues on 
which they did not prevail. Since this decision was made after a 
full hearing and the entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Lower Court's decision as to attorneys1 fees should not 
be overturned unless there is a showing of patent error or clear 
abuse of discretion. 
United States Supreme Court precident holds that ERISA pre-
empts all state common law and statutory causes of action stemming 
from a failure to pay benefits under ERISA-governed employee 
welfare benefit plans. The sole remedy available to beneficiaries 
of an ERISA plan is to seek to enforce payment of medical benefits 
and for attorneys1 fees. If Mountain States established an 
employee welfare benefit plan as a matter of law, the Lower Court 
was correct in dismissing all the Robertsons1 causes of action 
except for their claim for payment of medical expenses and 
reasonable attorneys1 fees. 
The employee welfare benefit plan ("Plan") as established by 
the undisputed facts in this case was the obtaining by Mountain 
States of group health insurance for its employees. Mountain 
States paid the premiums for single coverage for all of its 
employees, withheld the appropriate sums of money from its 
employeesf paychecks who opted to pay the extra premiums for more 
extensive family coverage, and routed those monies to Gem. 
Mountain States was also the liaison with Gem for its employees 
with regard to any questions concerning documents or problems 
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concerning claims, and maintained all administrative instruction 
sheets, change forms, group enrollment forms, and medical 
questionnaires sent by Gem. When taken in the aggregate, these 
undisputed acts show an intent on the part of Mountain States to 
establish a Plan for its employees. Accordingly, because Mountain 
States1 group health insurance policy is regulated by ERISA, all 
of the Robertsons1 claims against Gem, other than the denial of 
benefits claim, are pre-empted by ERISA and were properly dismissed 
as a matter of law. 
On or about September 6, 1990, Gem sent the Robertsons a check 
in the amount of $13,764.22 in full satisfaction of the Judgment 
entered against Gem on September 5, 199 0. The Robertsons, through 
their attorney, executed a Notice of Judgment and Satisfaction of 
Judgment on September 11, 1990, which was subsequently filed in the 
Lower Court, thus receiving the benefit of the Judgment by 
accepting payment thereon. The Robertsons have accepted the 
benefit of the attorneys1 fees paid and now seek to appeal the 
detrimental part of that Judgment denying them attorneys» fees they 
incurred in unsuccessfully opposing Gem's Motion to Dismiss. The 
Robertsons' actions constitute an acquiescence and acceptance of 
the Judgment. Therefore, the Robertsons have waived their right 
to appeal the attorneys' fee award in this matter. 
In addition, the Robertsons have accepted payment on a 
disputed claim. The Robertsons apparently dispute the amount of 
attorneys' fees awarded by the Lower Court and now attempt to 
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appeal the Lower Court's judgment. If a party accepts payment of 
a judgment, any portion of which is in dispute, that party waives 
all errors concerning that judgment. It is an inconsistent 
position for the Robertsons to accept payment of the attorneys' 
fees awarded by the Lower Court, then appeal the Lower Court's 
judgment as to attorneys' fees. 
The Robertsons maintain that any award for attorneys' fees 
should have granted under ERISA, not as a matter of state law. 
ERISA provides that reasonable attorneys' fees and costs may be 
awarded in any action under ERISA by a participant, beneficiary or 
fiduciary, in the discretion of the court. Courts have developed 
a five factor test to utilize when deciding whether an award of 
attorneys' fees is appropriate. Once the court has determined that 
an award of attorneys' fees is appropriate, it must make findings 
concerning the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees to award 
according to state law. Since the Lower Court did award attorneys' 
fees to the Robertsons and did make appropriate findings as to the 
reasonableness of those fees, the Lower Court's failure to rely on 
ERISA in deciding whether an award of attorneys' fees is 
appropriate is harmless error and its decision should be upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review. 
Because the Robertsons are appealing two different matters, 
that is, (1) the Lower Court's granting of Gem's Motion to Dismiss 
on the grounds that the Robertsons' state law claims are pre-
10 
empted by ERISA; and (2) the Lower Court's award of attorneys1 fees 
to the Robertsons after a full trial on the issue, two different 
standards of review apply. 
A. Motion to Dismiss. 
The standard of review employed by this Court when reviewing 
the facts used by a Lower Court in granting or denying a Motion to 
Dismiss1 is to view the facts alleged in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff. Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 85 (Utah 1981); 
Gonzales v. Morris, 610 P.2d 1285, 1286 (Utah 1980). In such an 
appeal, the question before the Court is, "did plaintiff's evidence 
when considered in the light most favorable to him show that he was 
entitled to relief?" Davis v. Payne and Day, Inc., 348 P.2d 337, 
338 (Utah 1960). The Lower Court's dismissal will be upheld if, 
as a matter of law, plaintiff could not recover under the facts 
alleged. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co. . Inc. . 779 P.2d 668, 669 
(Utah 1989). Gem submits, as set forth below, that even viewing 
the facts in a light most favorable to the Robertsons, they were 
beneficiaries under an ERISA plan and therefore all Utah state 
common law and statutory causes of action were pre-empted by the 
provisions of ERISA. 
1
 Throughout their brief, the Robertsons have confused Gem's 
Motion to Dismiss in the Lower Court with a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. However, the standard of review is the same. 
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B. Discretionary award of attorneys1 fees. 
The Robertsons also appeal the Lower Court's award of 
attorneys' fees to them. Since the Lower Court's award of 
attorneys' fees was made after a full hearing on that issue and the 
Lower Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law concerning 
attorneys' fees, its decision should not be overturned unless there 
is a showing of patent error or clear abuse of discretion. 
Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982); Sears v. 
Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 1982) ("The award of 
attorney's fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court and 
will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse 
of that discretion."); Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy 
Ass'n. , 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982) ("It is this Court's policy 
to accord great deference to the discretionary conclusions of the 
trial court regarding attorney fees."). 
The standard of review under federal law is the same as the 
standard under state law when applying the ERISA attorneys' fees 
provision: the Lower Court's decision on the award of attorneys' 
fees and costs can only be reversed if that decision constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 889 F.2d 
115, 121 (7th Cir. 1989). 
Gem submits that the Lower Court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding the Robertsons attorneys' fees on those matters on 
which they prevailed and denying the Robertsons attorneys' fees 
expended in opposing Gem's Motion to Dismiss, on which issue they 
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did not prevail. See, Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Nealef 
776 P.2d 643, 649, n.10 (Utah App. 1989). 
II. The Lower Court properly granted Gem's Motion 
to Dismiss on the basis that the Robertsons1 
causes of action for breach of implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and punitive 
damages are pre-empted by ERISA. 
A. Introduction - Prevailing case law. 
In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 107 S.Ct. 
1549 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that ERISA 
preempts all state common law and statutory causes of action 
stemming from a failure to pay benefits under ERISA-governed 
employee welfare benefit plans (referred to hereafter as "Plan"). 
The civil enforcement provisions in ERISA which provide for the 
resolution of disputes over the processing and payment of claims, 
2 9 U.S.C. § 113 2, are the sole remedy for a beneficiary of an 
ERISA-governed Plan who claims wrongful nonpayment of claims. 
Pilot Life, 107 S.Ct. at 1556. Indeed, the Robertsons have 
admitted that as long as they were beneficiaries of a Plan, they 
can bring no cause of action except a claim for payment of medical 
expenses, and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in pursuing that 
claim, under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. 
In reaching its decision in Pilot Life, the Supreme Court 
noted that Congress had included certain remedies in ERISA and 
excluded others. This exclusion of state common law tort and 
contract claims was part of a Congressional policy to balance the 
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need for prompt and fair payment and settlement of claims with the 
desire to encourage employers to form such Plans. To allow 
claimants to obtain remedies under state common law that Congress 
had rejected would improperly undermine the policy choices made by 
Congress. Id. at 1556. See also. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (ERISA provides no authority for an 
award of punitive damages). 
In exploring ERISA's broad pre-emption provisions in Pilot 
Life, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that ERISA's pre-
emption provisions were intentionally modeled after the very broad 
pre-emption provisions of Section 301 of the Labor-Management 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Pilot Life quotes the conference 
report on ERISA: 
Under the conference agreement, civil actions 
may be brought by participant or beneficiary 
to recover benefits due under the plan, to 
clarify rights to receive future benefits under 
the plan, and for relief from breach of 
fiduciary responsibility . . .. [W]ith 
respect to suits to enforce benefits rights 
under the plan or to recover benefits under 
the plan which do not involve the application 
of the title I provisions, they must be brought 
not only in U.S. District Courts but also in 
State courts of competent jurisdiction. All 
such actions in Federal or State courts are to 
be regarded as arising under the laws of United 
States in similar fashion to those brought 
under section 3 01 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act of 1947. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-
1280, p. 327 (1974), 107 S.Ct. at 1557. 
(Emphasis in original). 
The Supreme Court in Pilot Life then concludes: 
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Congress is well aware that the powerful pre-
emptive force of § 3 01 of LMRA displaced all 
state actions for violation of contracts 
between an employer and a labor organization, 
even when the state action purported to 
authorize a remedy unavailable under the 
federal provision . . . . 
Congress1 specific reference to Section 3 01 of 
the LMRA to describe civil enforcement scheme 
of ERISA makes clear its intention that all 
suits brought by beneficiaries or participants 
asserting improper processing of claims under 
ERISA-regulated plans be treated as federal 
questions governed by Section 502(a). 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
In Massachusetts Mutual Life v. Russell, 473 U.S. at 134, the 
Supreme Court set forth in detail the proper analytical approach 
to be followed in interpreting ERISA. The Court notes that the 
best guide to the meaning of the statute is the words used in the 
statute itself. The broad scope of the pre-emption language of 29 
U.S.C. § 1144 has repeatedly been recognized by courts as 
reflecting a deliberate intent by Congress that ERISA pre-emption 
is to be broadly interpreted and applied. The Russell Court 
reviews the legislative history in some detail and notes that an 
early version of ERISA contained a provision allowing for legal or 
equitable relief which was described in both the Senate and House 
Committee Reports as authorizing "the full range of legal and 
equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts." 
473 U.S. at 146, citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, page 17 (1973), U.S. 
Code Cong, and Admin. News 1974 pp. 4639, 4655, 2 Leg. Hist. 2364; 
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S. Rep. No, 93-127, p. 35 (1973), U.S. Code Cong, and Admin. News 
1974, pp. 438, 471, 1 Leg. Hist. 621. 
However, that language was deleted in the bill which passed 
the House of Representatives and was ultimately adopted by the 
Conference Committee. 473 U.S. at 146. In other words, the 
legislative history of ERISA shows, and the Russell court 
recognized, that Congress made a deliberate policy choice to limit 
the potential range of remedies available to plan participants and 
beneficiaries than might otherwise be available under state law. 
Since Pilot Life was handed down, federal circuit and district 
courts have confirmed the Supreme Court's limitation of remedies 
for ERISA-plan beneficiaries to ERISA's express civil enforcement 
provisions. In Belasco v. W. K. P. Wilson & Sonsf Inc., 833 F.2d 
277 (11th Cir. 1987) , the court found that claims for bad faith and 
fraud by the insurer were pre-empted by ERISA. The Tenth Circuit 
held that state common law claims of breach of contract are 
preempted by ERISA. Straub v. Western Union Tele. Co, , 851 F.2d 
1262 (10th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit has held that claims of 
breach of contract and duty of good faith and fair dealing are pre-
empted by ERISA. Soroskv v. Burroughs Corp. , 826 F.2d 794 (9th 
Cir. 1987). See also, Moore v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. 
Co. , 786 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff's claims for breach 
of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary 
duty and fraud are pre-empted by ERISA) ; Light v. Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc. , 790 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1986) 
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(plaintiff's claims for bad faith refusal to pay claims, 
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, negligent 
infliction of severe emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duties 
and deceit are pre-empted by ERISA); Howard v. Parisien, Inc., 807 
F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (dismissing as pre-empted plaintiff's 
claims for bad faith refusal to pay benefits and outrageous and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
The Seventh Circuit has pre-empted state common law claims for 
punitive damages and bad faith based upon ERISA's coverage. Reilly 
v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 846 F.2d 416 
(7th Cir. 1988). See also, Hermann Hospital v. MEBA Medical and 
Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1988) (breach of fiduciary 
duty, negligence, estoppel, breach of contract and fraud claims 
pre-empted by ERISA); Pane v. RCA Corp., 667 F.Supp. 168 (D.N.J. 
1987) (claims of breach of contract, emotional distress, punitive 
damages and exemplary damages pre-empted by ERISA); Peckham, et al. 
v. Gem State Mutual of Utah, No. Civ. 88-1513-T, slip opinion at 
3-7, (W.D. Okla. August 2, 1989) (Thompson C.J.) (claims of breach 
of duty of good faith and fair dealing, emotional distress, and 
punitive damages pre-empted by ERISA — excellent recitation of 
national case law) (a true and correct copy of the Western District 
of Oklahoma Courtfs opinion in Peckham is attached hereto as 
Addendum E). 
Therefore, if Mountain States established a Plan, the Lower 
Court was correct in dismissing all of the Robertsons' causes of 
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action except their claim for payment of medical expenses and 
reasonable attorneys1 fees. 
B. Definition of a Plan. 
A Plan is described under ERISA as: 
[A]ny plan, fund or program which was 
heretofore or is hereafter established or 
maintained by an employer or by an employee 
organization, or by both, to the extent that 
such plan, fund, or program was established or 
is maintained for the purpose of providing for 
its participants or their beneficiaries, 
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, 
(A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or 
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, 
accident, disability, death or unemployment or 
vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other 
training programs, or day care centers, 
scholarship funds or prepaid legal services, 
or (B) any benefits described in Section 302C 
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 
(other than pensions on retirement or death, 
and insurance to provide such pensions). 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) . 
The seminal case interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), and 
followed by the Pilot Life court as well as the overwhelming 
majority of federal and state courts, is Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 
F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh Circuit stated that a 
Plan requires the following: 
(1) A plan, fund or program; 
(2) established or maintained; 
(3) by an employer or by an employee organization, 
or by both; 
(4) for the purpose of providing medical, 
surgical, hospital care, sickness, accident, 
disability or death benefits; 
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(5) to participants or their beneficiaries. 
Id. at 13 71. The court went on to say that a Plan under ERISA is 
established if, from the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable 
person could determine the intended benefits of the Plan, the 
class of beneficiaries, the source of financing, and the 
procedures for receiving benefits. The Plan did not have to be in 
writing. Furthermore, the purchase of a group health insurance 
policy covering a class of employees offers substantial evidence 
that a plan was established. Id. at 1373. 
Generally, the existence of a Plan is a question of fact to 
be resolved in light of all the surrounding facts and 
circumstances from a point of view of a reasonable person. Kanne 
v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 867 F.2d 489, 492 (9th 
Cir. 1989), cert, den'd., 109 S.Ct. 3216 (1989). However, the 
facts before the Lower Court which determined that Mountain 
States1 provision of group health insurance to its employees was 
a Plan were undisputed. The multi-employer trust created by Gem 
and IMET is not the Plan. The Plan, as established by the 
undisputed facts in this case, was Mountain States' provision of 
group health insurance to its employees. Such provision 
established a Plan governed by ERISA. 
C. Mountain States established an ERISA-governed Plan. 
It was undisputed in the Lower Court that during the relevant 
time period in this action, Mountain States provided group health 
insurance coverage to its employees, including Plaintiff Craig 
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Robertson and his dependents. Mountain States paid the premiums 
for single coverage for all of its employees, withheld the 
appropriate money from its employees' paychecks who opted to pay 
the extra premiums for more extensive family coverage, and routed 
those monies to Gem. Mountain States was also the liaison with 
Gem for its employees with regard to any questions concerning 
documentation or problems concerning claims, and maintained 
administrative files with regard to all administrative instruction 
sheets, change forms, group enrollment forms and medical 
questionnaires. Gem routed benefit description booklets through 
Mountain States to its employees. When taken in the aggregate, 
these undisputed acts show an intent on the part of Mountain 
States to establish a comprehensive benefit plan for its 
employees. See. December 5, 1988 Approval Letter from Gem to 
Mountain States, a true and accurate copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum F. 
While evidence of the establishment of a Plan may be found in 
the language of the purported plan brochure or the insurance 
policy itself, this is not dispositive as to whether a Plan 
exists. Kanne, 867 F.2d at 493. The Kanne court found that due 
to the fact that the Plan brochure submitted by Connecticut 
General described the plan as an ERISA plan and because the 
employer endorsed that plan, there was not even a need for 
employer contributions or automatic employee coverage to bring the 
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plan within ERISA, as had been required by some post-Donovan 
courts. Id. 
In fact, most courts hold that even though an insurance 
policy, or corporate policy handbook, fails to mention that they 
are governed by ERISA, or fails to mention the requisite 
disclosures required under ERISA, they are still governed by 
ERISA, if it is determined to be a Plan. Dodd v. John Hancock 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. , 688 F.Supp. 564 (E.D. Ca. 1988); 
Comprehensive Care Corp. v. Douahtry, 682 F.Supp. 516 (S.D. Fl. 
1988) ; Benvenuto v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. , 643 
F.Supp. 87 (D. NJ 1988); Scott v. Gulf Oil Corp., 754 F.2d 1499 
(9th Cir. 1985) . These cases all hold that a Plan can be 
regulated by ERISA even if the requisite disclosures have not been 
made. If a Plan could avoid being regulated by ERISA merely by 
failing to comply with the rather onerous disclosure statements, 
ERISA would be eviscerated as a regulatory device. 
When an employer contracts with an insurance company (or in 
this case, joins a multi-employer trust which contracts with an 
insurance company), pays premiums directly to the insurance 
company, and has assumed control and responsibility for 
administering the policy, it has established a Plan. Local Union 
2134, UMW of America vs. Powhatan Fuel, Inc., 640 F.Supp. 731 
(N.D. Ala. 1986). At the other extreme is the case where an 
employer offers no benefit plan to its employees but leaves each 
employee free to purchase his or her own health insurance. Here 
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ERISA would not govern. Brundage-Peterson v. Comp. Health Care 
Services Insurance, 877 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989). 
Mountain States initiated a Plan for its employees by 
applying for and obtaining a group health insurance policy, paying 
the premiums for single coverage for each of its employees 
desiring coverage, administering the Plan by being a contact 
between its employees and Gem, arranging for the collection of 
premiums for excess coverage paid by its employees, and then 
forwarding those premiums, plus the premiums it paid on behalf of 
its employees, to Gem. 
In Brundage-Peterson v. Comp. Care Health Services Ins. Corp. 
877 F.2d at 509, a case similar to the one at bar, the plaintiff 
appealed a detrimental ruling in the trial court that the Plan was 
an ERISA plan and thus properly removed to the Federal District 
Court. The trial court, faced with the issue of whether a Plan 
was established, found that the employer had made contracts with 
two insurance companies to offer health insurance to its 
employees; that all employees were eligible for coverage except 
probationary employees; and that the employer paid for the 
employees1 (but not their dependents1) share of the insurance 
premiums. 
The Seventh Circuit, in finding the existence of a Plan, 
found that the Plan in Brundage-Peterson contained three 
components: 
22 
The contractual arrangements between the 
employer and the insurance companies whereby 
the latter agreed to insure the former's 
employees; the eligibility requirement of being 
an employee of more than 30 days' standing; and 
the employer's contributions of the worker's 
share of insurance premiums. 
Id. at 510. The court also noted that the approach followed by the 
Brundage-Petersons employer was "a common method by which employers 
provide health and other welfare benefits to their employees, and 
not one that has heretofore been thought to take a benefits plan 
out of ERISA." Id. at 511. Finally the court noted that an 
employer contracting with an insurance company (or a multi-employer 
trust) to provide insurance coverage for its employees is not the 
same as leaving each employee free to choose his or her insurance. 
Id. 
Such is the case here; Mountain States contracted with Gem 
through IMET to provide insurance benefits to its employees. It 
determined on what date its employees would be eligible to 
subscribe for insurance coverage and paid the premiums for its 
employees coverage. Payment of its employees' premiums to Mountain 
States strongly supports the existence of a Plan, as Mountain 
States helped to defray its employees' insurance costs. Id. 
In Overcash v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina, 
381 S.E.2d 330 (N.C. App. 1989), the court relied upon the fact 
that the employer funded a group insurance plan to establish the 
presence of an ERISA-covered plan, thus upholding the trial court's 
dismissal of the plaintiff's claims based on state law. In Rizzo 
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v. Travelers Insurance Co., 549 N.E.2d 810 (111. App. 1 Dist. 
1989) , an employer purchased a group life insurance policy from 
Travelers for the benefit of its employees. The court found that 
the purchase of the policy, along with the fact that the employee 
could change his beneficiary by obtaining the required forms from 
his employer and returning them to his employer, were sufficient 
enough to establish a plan under ERISA. In the case at bar, it is 
undisputed that Mountain States purchased health insurance for its 
employees and that applications and change forms for Mountain 
States1 employees were routed from Gem to Mountain States and from 
Mountain States1 employees through Mountain States to Gem. While 
Rizzo concerns life insurance, its facts relating to the 
establishment of a plan are equally applicable to the procurement 
of health insurance; both Rizzo and the case at bar concern group 
insurance policies. 
The Supreme Court has given some guidance on what constitutes 
an ERISA plan. In Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 
U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2211 (1987), the court found that a Maine law 
providing for a one-time severance payment to its employees in the 
event of a plant closing was not pre-empted by ERISA, as it did not 
establish a Plan. Court found that ERISA only pre-empts state laws 
relating to employee benefits and that this statute neither 
established nor required an employer to maintain an ongoing Plan. 
The statute did not require the employer to set up an 
administrative scheme or to assume responsibilities for benefits 
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on a regular basis. Therefore, the employer faced no periodic 
demands on its assets, no need for financial control was created, 
and the employer was not required to create an administrative 
program to process claims or handle premium payments on a monthly 
basis. Id. at 2218. 
While the Robertsons cite Fort Halifax Packing in support of 
their argument, the Robertsons wrongly interpret it to require 
employers to process claims as part of their administrative 
responsibility in order to be determined to be providing a Plan. 
This is an expansion of the Fort Halifax Packing ruling without any 
basis in the opinion. Mountain States did face a periodic demand 
on its assets, as it paid the premiums for its employees' coverage 
on a monthly basis. This shows far more activity by an employer 
than required by the state statute at issue in Fort Halifax 
Packing. Plaintiff Craig Robertson's employer's group health 
insurance policy benefits are a "plan" rather than a one time 
"benefit". See, Rizzi v. Blue Cross of Southern California, 206 
Cal.App.3d 380, 389 (1988). 
The Robertsons also cite Taggart Corp. v. Life and Health 
Benefits Administration, 617 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1980), which 
determined that on the facts of that case there was not a Plan 
established or maintained by an employer or an employee 
organization. However, Taggart can be distinguished on the fact 
that a corporation had purchased insurance for its sole employee. 
The court held that ERISA does not regulate the "bare purchase of 
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health insurance where, as here, the purchasing employer neither 
directly owns, controls, administers or assumes responsibility for 
the policy or its benefits." Id, at 1211. In Taggart, the 
employer did not participate in the day-to-day administration of 
the program, did not endorse the program, and only made payments 
to the insurance company. 
In addition, the reasoning in Taggart has been universally 
discredited, with any supportive opinions generally limited to the 
Fifth Circuit. In Donovan v Dillingham. 688 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir. 
1982), the Eleventh Circuit stated that it agreed with Taggart only 
insofar as its holding is "interpreted to mean ERISA does not 
regulate the purchase of health insurance where there is no welfare 
plan." Yet, Donovan disagreed with any interpretation of Taggart 
which would imply that an ERISA plan cannot be established if an 
employer merely purchases a group health insurance policy. The 
Donovan court reasoned that the purchase of insurance did not 
conclusively establish the existence of a plan, but it was evidence 
of a plan, and the purchase of a "group" policy covering a class 
of employees, such as the policy purchased by Mountain States, 
offered substantial evidence that a plan had been established. Id. 
at 1373. See also, Wickman v. Northwestern National Ins. Co., 908 
F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990). Most courts find the Donovan rationale 
more persuasive. See, Rizzi v. Blue Cross of So. California, 2 06 
Cal.App.3d 380 (1988). Mountain States did purchase a group 
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benefit plan and offered single coverage, for which it would pay, 
to all of its employees. 
In Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1077, plaintiff attempted to rely on 
Taggart to show that the plan provided by her husband's employer 
was not an ERISA-covered Plan. The First Circuit found it 
significant that in Taggart there was only one employee covered 
under the insurance and that it was the employer's only employee. 
Wickman further states that Taggart should not be interpreted to 
stand for the proposition "that an employer or employee 
organization that only purchases a group health insurance policy 
or subscribes to a [multi-employer trust] to provide health 
insurance to its employees or members cannot be said to have 
established or maintained an employee welfare benefit plan." Id. 
at 1083, citing to Donovan, 688 F.2d at 1375. "Taggart is merely 
a recognition that ERISA is not intended to cover situations where 
the employer merely 'advertises' insurance, and then makes 
voluntary deductions from the employees' paychecks." Wickman, 908 
F.2d at 1083. 
Mountain States did more than merely advertise insurance. It 
actively sought out group health insurance coverage for its 
employees and, unlike the employer in Taggart, paid for its 
employees' single coverage. Paying the employees' premiums is much 
different than making voluntary deductions from its employees' 
paychecks. 
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In Lambert v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins, Co,, 259 Cal.Rptr. 398 
(Cal. App.3d 1989), the plaintiff's employer secured medical 
insurance coverage* for its employees by subscribing to a multi-
employer trust which was underwritten by Pacific Mutual Life, 
similar to the facts in the case at bar. The employer paid the 
employees1 premiums but did not contribute for dependent coverage. 
In an affidavit opposing Pacific Mutual"s motion for summary 
judgment, the former president of the plaintiff's employer stated 
that he never attempted to establish any type of employee benefit 
plan under ERISA or to assume responsibility for or administer an 
ERISA plan. The ex-president further stated that he never filed 
any reports or information pursuant to ERISA. The trial court 
construed the motion for summary judgment as a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings and granted Pacific Mutual's motion, finding that 
the Pacific Mutual plan was an ERISA plan and that all the 
plaintiff's causes of action based on California common law were 
pre-empted. Id. at 401. 
The California Court of Appeals affirmed relying upon 
Department of Labor Regulations set forth in 29 C.F.R § 2510.3-
l(j) (1987). These Regulations state that 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) does 
"not include group insurance offered by an insurer to employers or 
members of an employee organization, when four criteria exist with 
respect to the program: 
(1) No contributions are made by an employer or an 
employee organization; 
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(2) Participation [in] the program is completely 
voluntary for the employees or members; 
(3) The sole function of the employer or employee 
organization with respect to the program are, 
without endorsing the program, to permit the insurer 
to publicize the program to employees or members, 
to collect premiums through payroll deductions, 
reduce checkoffs and to remit them to the insurer; 
and 
(4) The employer or employee organization receives no 
consideration in the form of cash or otherwise in 
connection with the program other than reasonable 
compensation, excluding any profit for 
administrative services actually rendered in 
connection with the payroll deduction reduced 
checkoffs. 
Id. at 402. The court went on to find that Pacific Mutual had 
established a ERISA plan. The employer paid the premiums for 
employee coverage through the date of the termination of insurance, 
the trust intended to create an ERISA plan and the employer 
tacitly, if not expressly, endorsed the plan. The fact that the 
employer's former president was not familiar with ERISA or the 
employer's obligations under ERISA "incident to the plan, does not 
refute the endorsement. A test of an ERISA plan based on an 
employer's subjective intent is neither legally sound nor 
consistent with ERISA." Id. at 403. 
Mountain States did more than merely permit Gem to advertise, 
and Mountain States did not merely collect premiums through payroll 
deductions or dues check offs, but made the contributions for its 
employees itself. Such actions by Mountain States establish the 
existence of an ERISA plan under the Department of Labor Regulation 
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found at 29 CFR § 2510.3-l(j) (1987) and within the reasoning of 
Lambert. 
The Robertsons cite in support of their argument a recent 
California Appellate Court case, Sayble v. Blue Cross of So. 
California, 255 Cal. Rptr. 144 (Cal. App. 1989), opinion on 
rehearing, 256 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Cal. App. 1989), an ill-reasoned 
and distinguishable, case, which found that an ERISA-regulated plan 
did not exist under the facts of that case. Ironically, the Court 
utilized the same standards consistently utilized by federal and 
state courts across the country, where ERISA plans were found in 
fact situations where the employers were far less involved than 
Mountain States. The California Court of Appeals found that no 
ERISA-regulated plan existed under its fact situation. However, 
in Sayble, there was no written or oral commitment by the employer 
to provide health insurance to its employees. Accordingly, Sayble 
is inapposite and should be ignored. 
The Robertsons cite Turnbow v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
765 P. 2d 1160 (Nev. 1988). Turnbow relies heavily on the generally 
discredited logic found within Taggart. In Turnbow the Robertsons 
find their requirement that in order to establish an ERISA plan it 
needs to be shown that an employer intended to guarantee the 
continued furnishing of the benefits. Such a requirement has not 
been found necessary by other courts to establish the existence of 
an ERISA plan. In fact, if a guarantee of the continued furnishing 
of benefits was required, only benefits given to employees pursuant 
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to labor-management negotiations would be subject to ERISA 
coverage. ERISA coverage is simply not so limited. 
In addition, Turnbow can be distinguished on the fact that the 
court found that the plaintiff was not an employee within the 
meaning of ERISA. The Turnbow court relied on Dodd v. John Hancock 
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 688 F.Supp. 564, 568 (E.D. Cal. 1988), in 
stating that if the plaintiff is not an employee she cannot be a 
participant or benefit in an ERISA plan. The Turnbow court went 
on to find that plaintiff was not an employee under ERISA as she 
was self-employed. Turnbow, 765 P.2d at 1162. In the instant 
case, Craig Robertson was an employee of Mountain States, not self 
employed nor a sole proprietor. As such, Turnbow is not on point 
and should be disregarded for the purposes of this appeal. 
All the cases the Robertsons have cited which they claim hold 
that a Plan was not established by an employer are either 
distinguishable (Fort Halifax Packing, Taggart Corp.) or they pre-
date the Donovan and Pilot Life cases. (Wayne v. Columbus Agency 
Service Corp.. 657 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977). 
The final argument the Robertsons make, as sort of a "tag end" 
to their claim that ERISA does not govern Mountain States1 Plan in 
the case at bar, is the House Report set forth on page 13 of their 
opening Brief. This report was issued shortly after ERISA was 
enacted and well before Donovan, Pilot Life and their progeny were 
decided. Prior to the issuance of this House Report, there was 
very little federal case law concerning ERISA. Since the House 
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Report was issued, almost every federal court in the nation that 
has had an opportunity to interpret the provisions of ERISA has 
interpreted them in support of Gem's position in this case. The 
obvious retort is that if Congress wishes to articulate remedies 
different than those expressly set forth in ERISA, as interpreted 
by the United States Supreme Court in Pilot Life and other courts 
throughout the nation, then the federal courts will take note of 
it. 
The undisputed facts in this case, within the context of 
extensive federal and state case law defining an employee welfare 
benefit plan and determining what plans are regulated by ERISA, 
support the Lower Court's decision that Mountain States' group 
health insurance policy was regulated by ERISA. The Robertsons 
agree that if Mountain States' group health insurance policy is 
regulated by ERISA, all of the Robertsons' claims against Gem, 
except for the denial of benefits claim, are pre-empted and were 
properly dismissed. Accordingly, because Mountain States' group 
health insurance policy is regulated by ERISA, all of the 
Robertsons' claims against Gem, other than the denial of benefits 
claim, are pre-empted by ERISA and were properly dismissed as a 
matter of law. 
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III. The Lower Court properly limited the 
Robertsons1 award of attorneys1 fees solely to 
those issues upon which they prevailed. 
A. The Robertsons have accepted the benefits of the judgment with 
regard to attorneys1 fees and are therefore estopped from 
attacking the judgment on appeal. 
On or about September 6, 1990, Gem sent the Robertsons a check 
in the amount of $13,764.22 in full satisfaction of the judgment 
entered against Gem on September 5, 1990. The Robertsons, through 
their attorney, executed a Notice of Judgment and Satisfaction of 
Judgment on September 11, 1990, thus receiving the benefit of the 
judgment by accepting payment thereon. The law in Utah is well 
settled that one who accepts the benefit of a judgment may not 
attack that judgment on appeal. Jacobsen Const, v. St. Joseph High 
School, 794 P.2d 505 (Utah App. 1990). 
In Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973), this Court 
stated: "We are in agreement with the general rule that if a 
judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted, and a judgment 
satisfied, the controversy has become moot and the right to appeal 
is waived." This Court went on to note that an exception to the 
general rule is where one part of the controversy is separate and 
distinct from another part, appeal may be taken on that separate 
issue. Here the issues of attorneys' fees is not separate nor 
distinct from the judgment which was entered, but was ruled on by 
the Lower Court. Thus, the exception to the general rule as to the 
attorneys1 fees issue is not present. Jacobsen Const., 794 P.2d 
at 506, 507. In Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1987), 
33 
this court refused to reach the merits of a dispute because the 
appellant lost "his right to appeal by acquiescing in and accepting 
the benefits under the judgment . . . ." Hence, in the present 
case, the Robertsons may not appeal the attorneys1 fees issue, 
having accepted the benefit of payment of the judgment. Of course, 
having paid the judgment, Gem could not have cross-appealed the 
Lower Court's ruling in favor of the Robertsons on their claim of 
wrongful denial of insurance benefits. 
The reasoning for the "accepting of benefits" doctrine is 
well-stated in Trees: 
An appellant who accepts the benefit of a 
judgment from which he is appealing 
accomplishes a significant shift in the burden 
of risk; he exposes the respondent to the 
possibility of not only a possible loss on 
appeal, but also the potential loss of the 
benefits he has provided the appellant. 
Id. at 613. Gem has provided a benefit to the Robertsons in that 
it has paid the Robertsons their attorneys' fees awarded. Should 
this Court remand the issue of the Robertsons1 entitlement to 
attorneys' fees, Gem may have to recover the funds that it has paid 
out from the Robertsons, who may not be willing or able to refund 
it, exposing Gem to the further cost of a collection suit. Indeed, 
had Gem known the P.obertsons were going to appeal their award of 
attorneys' fees, Gem would not have paid the Lower Court's judgment 
and would have cross-appealed. 
The Robertsons now claim that only a portion of the case is 
at rest. They claim that the issue of attorneys' fees remains 
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viable even though the Satisfaction of Judgment drafted by the 
Robertsons' counsel fails to reference any intention to preserve 
the right of appeal upon any portion of the case. The Satisfaction 
of Judgment reads in its pertinent part: "... Plaintiffs further 
acknowledge satisfaction of the same judgment by payment of 
Defendant to Plaintiff in the amount of $13,764.22." 
In Hollinasworth v. Farmers Insurance Co., 655 P. 2d 637 (Utah 
1982), the Utah Supreme Court refused to sanction such tactics. 
There, a judgment creditor drafted a general satisfaction of 
judgment with no reference to an intent to appeal any portion of 
the case. Thereafter, the judgment creditor attempted to appeal 
a portion of the judgment. This court refused to allow the appeal, 
ruling that absent contrary expression regarding the satisfaction 
of judgment, the matter was completely at rest and the right to 
appeal foreclosed. 
In Dooley v. Cal-Cut Pipe and Supply, Inc. , 593 P.2d 360 (Col. 
1979), the Court addressed the issue of attorneys1 fees in the 
context of satisfaction and acquiescence in the judgment. The 
trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff after trial, 
awarding damages in the amount of $16,880.97. Furthermore, the 
judgment provided that the plaintiff was entitled to a post-
judgment hearing on additional attorneys' fees. The parties 
entered into an agreement wherein for consideration of a payment 
of $17,008.20 the plaintiff agreed to entry of a satisfaction of 
judgment. However, a few months later, the plaintiff recanted and 
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filed a motion for attorneys' fees. The trial court held that the 
plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing on additional attorneys' 
fees due to the fact that he had executed a satisfaction of 
judgment. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, stating 
that a satisfaction of judgment is the end of a proceeding. The 
court also stated: "Had the plaintiff intended not to release its 
claim to additional attorneys' fees, the satisfaction could have 
been so limited. No such limiting phrases were used." Id. at 362. 
In addition, the Robertsons could have preserved their right 
to appeal the attorneys' fees portion of the judgment by offering 
to accept payment for the insurance benefits withheld plus 
interest, but refusing to accept payment for their attorneys' fees. 
If the Robertsons had desired to preserve their right to appeal the 
attorneys' fees portion of the Lower Court's decision, they should 
have so limited the Satisfaction of Judgment drafted by their 
attorney. Gem should not be placed in the position, after having 
attempted to put this matter to rest, of being faced with the 
additional potential liability of either having to pay additional 
attorneys' fees or instituting a new action to recover fees 
previously awarded and paid to the Robertsons and vacated by this 
Court. 
Other jurisdictions have found that acquiescence in a judgment 
is sufficient to cut off a right of appeal. See, First National 
Bank of Wichita v. Fink. 736 P.2d 909, 911 (Kan. 1987) (". . . a 
party to litigation who acquiesces in judgment of a Trial Court, 
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either by assuming the burdens of such judgment or by accepting the 
benefits thereof, will be deemed to have acquiesced in the judgment 
and may not thereafter adopt an inconsistent position and appeal 
from such judgment") ; Hart v. Jett Enterprises, Inc,f 744 P.2d 561, 
562 (Okl. 1985) (H[A]ctual payment of a judgment in full to a 
person authorized to receive it operates as a discharge of the 
judgment"). 
In Adams v. Unterkircher, 714 P.2d 193 (Okl. 1985), the 
parties disputed the matter in which the trial court awarded 
attorneys1 fees in a partition action. However, prior to the 
appeal, the appealing party collected and cashed the county clerk's 
vouchers which were issued pursuant to the trial court's decision 
in payment of their fees. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that 
by cashing the vouchers, the party waived the right to file an 
appeal. "[L]itigants who voluntarily accept the fruits of a 
judgment cannot bring an appeal to reverse it because acceptance 
of the benefit of a part of the judgment favorable to an appellant 
waives the right to appeal its detrimental parts.11 Id. at 196. 
See also, Tara Oil Co. v. Kennedy and Mitchell, Inc., 622 P.2d 1076 
(Okl. 1981). In the case at bar, the Lower Court awarded the 
Robertsons attorneys1 fees on the issues on which they prevailed. 
Gem then issued a check to the Robertsons covering the benefits 
withheld, interest, costs and attorneys1 fees. This check was 
accepted by the Robertsons and cashed, and the Satisfaction of 
Judgment entered. The Robertsons have voluntarily accepted the 
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fruits of the judgment concerning attorneys1 fees and should not 
now be able to bring an appeal to reverse or enhance that judgment• 
Gem issued a check to the Robertsons and sent it to Jeffery 
Peatross, the Robertsons' counsel, along with correspondence 
stating that acceptance of this payment would constitute full 
satisfaction of the judgment. See, Addendum C. The check was 
accepted and cashed, and a Satisfaction of Judgment was filed. 
Such actions constitute an acquiescence and acceptance of the 
judgment and therefore, the Robertsons have waived their right to 
appeal the attorneys' fee award in this matter. 
B. The Robertsons have accepted a portion of the attorneys' fees 
which was in dispute, thereby waiving their right to appeal 
any errors involved in rendering the judgment as to attorneys' 
fees. 
The Robertsons prayed for an award of attorneys' fees they 
incurred in pursuit of their claims. The Lower Court heard 
testimony and took evidence as to the amount of time spent by the 
Robertsons' counsel, and the reasonable value of those services. 
The Lower Court then awarded the Robertsons attorneys' fees for 
the time spent by their counsel on the issues on which they 
prevailed, citing Mountain States Broadcasting Co., 776 P.2d 643. 
See, Memorandum Decision R. 243. 
Gem then paid the Robertsons, as part of the judgment, the 
attorneys1 fees awarded by the Lower Court, which the Robertsons 
accepted even though they now dispute the amount. If a party 
accepts payment of a judgment, any portion of which is in dispute, 
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that party waives all errors concerning that judgment. See, 169 
A.L.R. 1047, and authorities cited therein. 
In Ballinaer v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 91 N.W. 767 
(Iowa 19 02), the plaintiff accepted a disputed payment of 
attorneys1 fees in the amount of $100.00 (the plaintiff had 
previously claimed attorneys1 fees in the amount of $150.00). The 
court held that by accepting the amount of the judgment awarded her 
(minus attorneys1 fees awarded plaintiff) , the plaintiff had waived 
her right of appeal because upon a reversal she might possibly 
receive less. "A portion of the amount drawn by [the plaintiff] 
was in dispute, and receiving it . . . was a waiver of the errors 
involved in receiving the judgment." Id. at 768. Also, acceptance 
of the attorneys1 fees by the attorney waives his client's right 
to appeal that judgment. Kneble v. Kneble, 189 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 
App. 1945). If the Robertsons' appeal on the issue of attorneys' 
fees is entertained, it is possible that they may not ultimately 
be successful in the action, or may be awarded a different amount 
as attorneys' fees. Root v. Heil, 43 N.W. Rptr. 278 (Iowa 1889). 
The Robertsons disputed the amount of attorneys' fees they 
were awarded by the Lower Court. However, they willingly accepted 
Gem's check, including portions thereof relating to payment of 
those attorneys' fees. It is inappropriate, and contrary to 
prevailing case law, for the Robertsons to accept payment of the 
attorneys' fees awarded by the Lower Court and then have the right 
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to appeal the Lower Court's judgment as to attorneys' fees, 
Knebel, 189 S.W.2d at 467. 
C. The Lower Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
attorneys1 fees to the Robertsons only on those issues on 
which they prevailed. 
The Robertsons maintain in their opening brief that any award 
for attorneys' fees should have been granted under ERISA, not under 
state law. After finding that Gem wrongfully denied the Robertsons 
insurance benefits, the Lower Court concluded that the Robertsons 
were entitled to their attorneys' fees for time spent by their 
counsel upon the issues on which they prevailed. In doing so, the 
Lower Court relied on state law, citing the Utah Court of Appeals 
decision in Mountain States Broadcasting, 776 P.2d 643. The Lower 
Court apparently was relying on footnote 10 of that_opinion, which 
states: 
Of course, a reasonable fee will compensate NBA 
[the prevailing party] only for those fees 
necessarily incurred in resolution of issues 
in NBA's favor, and should not include fees 
relating to the issues resolved in Mountain 
States' favor. See, Stacey Properties v. 
Wixen, 766 P.d 1080, 1085 (Utah App. 1988) 
(party entitled to attorneys' fee "was entitled 
to attorneys' fees for the claims on which it 
was successful"). 
Mountain States Broadcasting, 776 at n.10. 
ERISA provides for attorneys' fees: "In any action under this 
title . . . by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court 
in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorneys' fee and costs 
of action to either party." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (emphasis 
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added). In construing this section of ERISA, courts have developed 
a five factor test. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978). 
The five factors include: 
(1) The degree of the offending parties1 
culpability or bad faith; 
(2) The degree of the ability of the offending 
parties to personally satisfy an award of 
attorneys' fees; 
(3) Whether or not an award of attorneys' fees 
against the offending parties would deter other 
persons acting under similar circumstances; 
(4) The amount of the benefit conferred on the 
members of the pension plan as a whole; and 
(5) The relative merits of the parties' 
position. 
Id. at 465. However, the Eaves factors are only some of the 
factors a trial court may consider. Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 
634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980). 
The Eaves factors are only used to determine whether an award 
of attorneys' fees is appropriate, not the amount. U.N.C. Teton 
Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584, 593 (Wyo. 
1989). Once the court has determined whether an award of 
attorneys' fees is appropriate, it must make findings concerning 
the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees to award according to 
state law. Id. 
Gem admits that the Lower Court did not rely on 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(g)(1) or the five factors set forth in Eaves in making its 
decision to award attorneys' fees to the Robertsons. However, Gem 
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submits that this is harmless error. The Lower Court did award 
attorneys1 fees to the Robertsons and made specific findings as to 
the reasonableness of these fees. Under the rules of appellate 
review, this Court can affirm the Lower Court on any proper ground, 
even if the Lower Court assigned an incorrect reason for its 
ruling. Alphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P. 2d 860, 861 (Utah 
1979) . Furthermore, this Court can affirm the Lower Court on 
grounds argued for the first time on appeal. Buehner Block Co. v. 
U.W.C. Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). On this basis, 
Gem submits that the Lower Court did not abuse its discretion in 
the amount of attorneys' fees it awarded the Robertsons. 
Merely because a party prevails under ERISA does not 
automatically mean that party is entitled to an award of attorneys' 
fees. Overcash v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina, 
381 S.E.2d 330, 339 (N.C. App. 1989). Because, under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(g)(1), it is within the trial court's discretion to award 
attorneys' fees to either party, courts have held that 
institutional defendants are entitled to attorneys' fees from 
individual plaintiffs where the defendant has shown that the 
plaintiff brought the action in bad faith or that the action was 
frivolous. Cowden v. Montgomery County Soc. for Cancer Control, 
653 F.Supp. 1072 (S.D. Ohio 1986). In the case at bar, the Lower 
Court did not award attorneys' fees to Gem, but simply held that 
the Robertsons were not entitled to their attorneys' fees on the 
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issues on which they did not prevail. This is within the Lower 
Court!s discretion. 
In Bittner v. Sadoff and Rudoy Industries, 728 F.2d 820 (7th 
Cir. 1984), the court adopted the Eaves five factor test for 
evaluating requests for attorneys1 fees and costs under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(g)(1), in the case where the plaintiff prevails and seeks 
an award of attorneys1 fees. Id. at 829. But Bittner proposed an 
alternative test under which fees are to be awarded to the 
prevailing defendant. Id. at 829. The Bittner test for prevailing 
defendants was derived from the Equal Access to Justice Act, 2 8 
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), which entitles a prevailing party to a 
reasonable attorneys1 fee. In Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc. , 
889 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh Circuit Court in 
addressing both the Eaves test and the Bittner prevailing defendant 
test stated: 
It is difficult to imagine a situation in which 
the application of one test rather than the 
other would alter our decision concerning the 
propriety of an award of costs or fees. Both 
tests are designed to award costs and fees to 
the prevailing party where there is reason to 
believe that the losing party engaged in the 
litigation really to harass its opponent. 
Furthermore, as we noted in Marquardt v. North 
American Car Corp., 652 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 
1981), a denial of fees will seldom constitute 
an abuse of discretion. 
Nichol 889 F.2d at 122. (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar, the 
Lower Court found that the Robertsons were the prevailing party and 
awarded attorneys1 fees to them only on the issue of wrongful 
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denial of insurance benefits. Even if the Lower Court had made a 
determination to award the Robertsons fees pursuant to ERISA, 
rather than under state law, it could have used the same 
"prevailing party" rationale to arrive at the amount of attorneys1 
fees awarded. It is difficult to see how such an award can be 
viewed as an abuse of the Lower Court's discretion. 
In applying the Eaves factors to the case at bar, it becomes 
clear that the Lower Court did not abuse its discretion in its 
decision to award attorneys' fees to the Robertsons only on the 
issue on which they prevailed. Factor one refers to the easy case 
where the position of the party opposing the* application for 
attorneys' fees is frivolous. Bittner, 728 F.2d at 829. It cannot 
be said that Gem"s defense of the Robertsons' Complaint was 
frivolous. Gem prevailed on the existence of an ERISA Plan and 
ERISA pre-emption as to the Robertsons' state common law and 
statutory causes of action in the Lower Court. 
Under factor two, Gem does not dispute that it has the ability 
to satisfy an award of attorneys' fees; as noted above, it already 
has. Under factor three, the award of attorneys1 fees against Gem 
would not deter other persons acting under similar circumstances. 
Gem made its decision to deny coverage to the Robertsons based upon 
the particular facts of Mrs. Robertson's injury and her own medical 
records. Because Gem's decision was made on a factual 
interpretation and not a legal interpretation of ERISA, it is 
unlikely that the award of additional attorneys' fees to the 
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Robertsons would have a deterrent effect on Gem, let alone other 
parties faced with similar circumstances. 
It is significant that under factor four of Eaves, the 
Robertsons have not sought to benefit anyone other than themselves 
or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA. 
Therefore, under this factor the Robertsons would not be entitled 
to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) 
and the Lower Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
Robertsons their attorneys' fees on the issue on which they did 
not prevail. Blanton v. Anzalone, 760 F.2d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 
1985) . 
The law concerning the award of attorneys1 fees within a civil 
rights case is applicable to ERISA. Bueno v. CF&I Steel Corp., 773 
P.2d 937, 941 (Wyo. 1989). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, plaintiffs 
bringing civil rights actions may be awarded attorneys' fees. 
Courts have held that factors considered in awarding attorneys' 
fees to civil rights plaintiffs may be used in making a 
determination whether attorneys' fees are properly awarded under 
ERISA. In civil rights cases plaintiffs are entitled to their 
attorneys' fees when they are the prevailing party. Von Clark v. 
Butler, 916 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1990). 
In Von Clark, the court ruled that the plaintiff was only 
entitled to fees for those hours reasonably expended in pursuing 
the claims on which he was successful. "When a plaintiff fails to 
prevail on a claim that is separate and distinct from his 
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successful claims, the hours expended on the unsuccessful claim 
should be excluded from the calculation of a reasonable fee." Id. 
at 259. The issue of the existence of an ERISA Plan that the 
Robertsons are appealing is a separate and distinct issue from the 
issue of wrongful denial of insurance benefits. Since the 
Robertsons were not successful on their defense of Gem's Motion to 
Dismiss, they are not entitled to attorneys' fees for the time 
spent in opposition to that motion. 
In Marquardt v. North American Car Corp., 652 F.2d 715, 717 
(7th Cir. 1981), the court stated: 
But an award of attorneys' fees under ERISA 
also differs significantly from an attorneys' 
fees award under the Civil Rights Act,, We do 
not hold that these five factors constitute the 
only test which district court can use in 
whether to award attorneys' fees under ERISA. 
Under the ERISA attorneys' fees provision, unlike under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988, it cannot be said that the purpose of the provision is to 
allow prevailing plaintiffs to obtain an award of attorneys' fees 
almost as a matter of course, but awarding prevailing defendants 
fees only if the suit was frivolous. 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 indicates a clear legislative history that 
the purpose for the enactment of the statute was to encourage 
meritorious civil rights litigation. Bittner, 728 F.2d at 829. 
"There is nothing comparable in the legislative history of ERISA; 
nor do pension plan participants and beneficiaries constitute a 
vulnerable group whose members need special encouragement to 
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exercise their legal rights, like a racial minority." Id. The 
Bittner court goes on to state: 
It does not follow that whoever wins, plaintiff 
or defendant, is entitled to attorney's fees 
as a matter of course under § 1132(g)(1). If 
that was the legislators' intention they 
expressed it very badly by giving the district 
court "discretion" to award or not award fees. 
Almost certainly it was not their intention. 
It would be tantamount to adopting the English 
(and Continental) rule that the winning party 
to a lawsuit is automatically awarded a 
reasonable attorney's fee. Not only has 
American common law, state and federal, 
steadfastly refused to adopt the English rule, 
[citations omitted], but it is very difficult 
to find among the federal fee-shifting 
statutes, numerous as they now are, ones that 
adopted it. 
Id. at 830. 
Gem is not claiming in this appeal, unlike the defendant in 
Bittner, that it is entitled to its attorneys' fees below; rather, 
the Robertsons were awarded their attorneys' fees below on the 
issues on which they prevailed, the award was reasonable, and under 
no circumstances would the Robertsons be entitled to an award of 
all of their attorneys' fees as a matter of course. Although the 
Lower Court did not make express findings as to the Eaves factors, 
this was harmless error and the amount of the award of attorneys' 
fees awarded by the Lower Court should be upheld. 
Under the ERISA provisions authorizing an award of attorneys1 
fees, the right to an award of attorneys' fees is determined by 
federal law. However, the procedures for proof and computation of 
the amount of attorneys' fees properly awarded is a matter of state 
law. UNC Teton Exploration Drilling v. Pevton. 774 P.2d 584, 593 
(Wyo. 1989). "To receive that award, the party must prevail and 
the fee awarded should be determined by the trial court to be 
reasonable." Id. at 594f 595. The party claiming attorneys' fees 
should first present the court with an itemized billing reflecting 
the attorney's time and rate. The determination of the 
reasonableness of the rate is within the discretion of the trial 
court and the burden of proving the reasonableness of the fee 
requested rests with the claimant. Id. at 595. 
In the case at bar, the Lower Court received evidence of the 
Robertsons' counsel's hours spent on the case, and a requested 
hourly rate of $95 per hour. The Lower Court then determined that 
a reasonable rate in the Provo, Utah area for the Robertsons' 
counsel was $65.00 per hour. The determination by the Lower Court 
as to the attorney's reasonable hourly rate was within the sound 
discretion of that Court. The Lower Court went on to make an 
additional discretionary ruling that the Robertsons were not 
entitled to attorneys' fees on the matters on which they did not 
prevail. This decision was also within the sound discretion of the 
Lower Court and is supported by Utah precedent. Stacey Properties 
v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah App. 1988). Accordingly, while 
the Lower Court may have applied the incorrect legal standard in 
deciding whether an award of attorneys' fees was proper, it did 
make proper findings as to the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees 
to which the Robertsons were entitled. 
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In Herbst v. Humana Health Insurance of Nevada, Inc., 781 P.2d 
762, 764 (Nev. 1989), the court stated: 
The five factors mentioned in Hummell [similar 
to the Eaves factors] are used only to 
determine whether or not attorney's fees should 
be awarded in a case governed by ERISA. There 
are no cases which stand for the proposition 
that the Hummell factors should be used to 
determine the amount of the attorney's fees to 
be awarded. 
The court went on to state that after a court has decided that an 
award of attorneys' fees is appropriate, then it must multiply the 
number of hours reasonably spent on the case by a reasonable hourly 
rate, commonly termed the lode star amount. Id. 
There is both Federal and State precedent supporting the Lower 
Court's award of attorneys' fees to the Robertsons only on the 
issues on which they prevailed. A factor to be considered in the 
amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded by the trial court is the 
amount of time expended on claims upon which the party prevailed. 
Riemersma, 655 P. 2d at 1110. This Court has held that, under 
appropriate circumstances, where a party is unsuccessful on certain 
claims, attorneys' fees incurred in prosecution of those claims may 
not be recovered. Paul Mueller Co. , 657 P. 2d at 1288. Where a 
plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that -is distinct at all 
from his successful claims, he should not be entitled to attorneys' 
fees for work done on the unsuccessful claims. Henselv v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). 
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In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), this 
Court set forth factors for trial courts to use in determining the 
amount of attorneys' fees properly awarded. The Lower Court took 
evidence as to those factors and determined that $4,192.50 was a 
reasonable attorney's fee in this matter. In doing so, the Lower 
Court limited the Robertsons' award of attorneys' fees to those 
issues on which they prevailed. See, Occidental/Nebraska Fed. 
Savings v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990),. The Trial Court 
did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of 
attorneys' fees awarded to the Robertsons. 
The Trial Court did award the Robertsons their attorneys' 
fees, even though the Lower Court did not make findings as the 
appropriatness of the fees under the ERISA standard. However, had 
it used the ERISA standard, the Lower Court could have come to the 
exact same result, that the Robertsons were entitled to an award 
of fees. The Lower Court would then look to state law to determine 
the amount of those attorneys' fees. In doing so, it could, as it 
did, limit the Robertsons' award of attorneys' fees only to those 
issues on which they prevailed. Gem therefore submits that this 
Court should uphold the Lower Court's award of attorneys' fees to 
the Robertsons on the alternate ground that because attorneys' fees 
were awarded and the appropriate findings, pursuant to state law, 
were made as to the reasonableness of those fees, the Lower Court's 
utilization of a state law standard rather than an ERISA standard 
was not reversable error. 
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IV. The Robertsons1 appeal is so frivolous that Gem 
should be awarded double costs, including its 
reasonable attorneys1 fees. 
Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
as follows: 
. . . if the court determines that a motion 
made or appeal taken under these rules is 
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award 
just damages, which may include single or 
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorneys1 fees, to the prevailing 
party. 
In O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987), the 
Court of Appeals defined a frivolous appeal as "one having no 
reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a)." The 
Court of Appeals realized that this may create a lesser standard 
than the standard created by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1953, as 
amended) , but "since a party has already been to court once and has 
had the benefit of one ruling, the decision to appeal should be 
reached only after careful consideration by the party and counsel." 
O'Brien, 744 P.2d at 310. See, Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 
1953) (construing the standard created by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-
56 (1953, as amended)). 
In Barber v. Imporium Partnership, 750 P. 2d 202 (Utah App. 
1988), the court awarded the plaintiff costs and attorneys' fees, 
finding that the defendant failed to make a timely appeal. While 
the Robertsons have made a timely appeal, they are appealing the 
attorneys1 fees award in a judgment from which they sought payment 
and filed a Notice of Satisfaction of Judgment. This makes the 
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Robertsons' position as egregious as that of the defendant in 
Barber, In addition, the Robertsons are appealing the Lower 
Court's decision that ERISA pre-empts their state common law and 
statutory causes of action. The Robertsons bring this appeal 
against the overwhelming majority of precedent; therefore their 
appeal is frivolous. 
The Court of Appeals has also cited with approval Auburn 
Harpswell Ass'n v. Day, 438 A.2d 234 (Maine 1981), which case 
examines when the imposition of sanctions is appropriate. Porco 
v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988). The court in Day 
said that sanctions should be applied when: 
an appeal is obviously without merit and has 
been taken with no reasonable likelihood of 
prevailing and results in delayed 
implementation of the judgment of the lower 
court; increased costs of the litigation; and 
dispensation of time and resources of the lower 
court. 
Day, 438 A.2d at 339. The Robertsons have certainly increased the 
costs of litigation and caused dispensation of the time and 
resource of both this Court and the Lower Court by appealing their 
award of attorneys' fees in a judgment which has been voluntarily 
satisfied. 
The Robertsons and their counsel could not have reached their 
decision to appeal "after careful consideration". O'Brien, 744 
P.2d at 310. Had they carefully considered the facts and law, they 
would realized there is no legal or factual basis for their appeal 
on either the issue of attorneys' fees or of ERISA pre-emption. 
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Backstram Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P. 2d 1157 (Utah App. 
1988); Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1988). 
The record in this case leaves no doubt that the Robertsons' appeal 
is frivolous. Therefore, Gem suggests that this is an appropriate 
case in which to award Gem double costs, and remand to the Lower 
Court for a determination of attorneys' fees incurred by Gem on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Gem respectfully requests 
that this Court dismiss the Robertsons' appeal, affirm the Lower 
Court's decision granting Gem's Motion to Dismiss and awarding the 
Robertsons attorneys' fees in the amount of $4,192.50, and award 
Gem double its costs incurred in opposing the Robertsons' appeal, 
pursuant to Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this j \ day of March, 1991. 
WILKINS, ORITT & RONNOW 
Jeffrey R/. Orii;t ~ 
Kevin J./Fiif , 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Gem Insurance Company 
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ADDENDUM A 
29 USCS § 1002 LABOR 
§ 1002. Definitions 
For purposes of this title: 
(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean 
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter 
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organiza-
tion, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was 
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its partici-
pants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or 
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits 
in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or 
vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care 
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit 
described in section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 
1947 [29 USCS § 186(c)] (other than pensions on retirement or death, 
and insurance to provide such pensions). 
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the terms "employee 
pension benefit plan" and "pension plan" mean any plan, fund, or 
program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to 
the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding 
circumstances such plan, fund, or program— 
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or 
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods 
extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond, 
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the 
plan, the method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the 
method of distributing benefits from the plan. 
(B) The Secretary may by regulation prescribe rules consistent with 
the standards and purposes of this Act providing one or more exempt 
categories under which— 
(i) severance pay arrangements, and 
(ii) supplemental retirement income payments, under which the 
pension benefits of retirees or their beneficiaries are supplemented 
to take into account some portion or all of the increases in the cost 
of living (as determined by the Secretary of Labor) since retire-
ment, 
shall, for purposes of this title, be treated as welfare plans rather than 
pension plans. In the case of any arrangement or payment a principal 
effect of which is the evasion of the standards or purposes of this Act 
applicable to pension plans, such arrangement or payment shall be 
treated as a pension plan. 
(3) The term "employee benefit plan" or "plan" means an employee 
welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which 
is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension 
benefit plan. 
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(4) The term "employee organization" means any labor union or any 
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation 
committee, association, group, or plan, in which employees participate 
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with 
employers concerning an employee benefit plan, or other matters inci-
dental to employment relationships; or any employees' beneficiary associ-
ation organized for the purpose in whole or in part, of establishing such 
a plan. 
(5) The term "employer" means any person acting directly as an 
employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an 
employee benefit plan; and includes a group or association of employers 
acting for an employer in such capacity. 
(6) The term "employee" means any individual employed by an em-
ployer. 
(7) The term "participant" means any employee or former employee of 
an employer, or any member or former member of an employee 
organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any 
type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such 
employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may 
be eligible to receive any such benefit. 
(8) The term "beneficiary" means a person designated by a participant, 
or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become 
entitled to a benefit thereunder. 
(9) The term "person" means an individual, partnership, joint venture, 
corporation, mutual company, joint-stock company, trust, estate, unin-
corporated organization, association, or employee organization. 
(10) The term "State" includes any State of the United States, the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, 
Guam, Wake Island, and the Canal Zone. The term "United States" 
when used in the geographic sense means the States and the Outer 
Continental Shelf lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act (43 U.S.C 1331-1343). 
(11) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transporta-
tion, or communication between any State and any place outside thereof. 
(12) The term "industry or activity affecting commerce" means any 
activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute 
would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce, and 
includes any activity or industry "affecting commerce" within the 
meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, or the Railway 
Labor Act. 
(13) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Labor. 
(14) The term "party in interest" means, as to an employee benefit 
plan— 
(A) any fiduciary (including, but not limited to, any administrator, 
officer, trustee, or custodian), counsel, or employee of such employee 
benefit plan; 
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(B) a person providing services to such plan; 
(C) an employer any of whose employees are covered by such plan; 
(D) an employee organization any of whose members are covered by 
such plan; 
(E) an owner, direct or indirect, of 50 percent or more of— 
(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote 
or the total value of shares of all classes of stock of a corporation, 
(ii) the capital interest or the profits interest of a partnership, or 
(hi) the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated enterprise, 
which is an employer or an employee organization described in 
subparagraph (C) or (D); 
(F) a relative (as defined in paragraph (15)) of any individual 
described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E); 
(G) a corporation, partnership, or trust or estate of which (or in 
which) 50 percent or more of— 
(i) the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote 
or the total value of shares of all classes of stock of such corpora-
tion, 
(ii) the capital interest or profits interest of such partnership, or 
(iii) the beneficial interest of such trust or estate, 
is owned directly or indirectly, or held by persons described in 
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E); 
(H) an employee, officer, director (or an individual having powers or 
responsibilities similar to those of officers or directors), or a 10 
percent or more shareholder directly or indirectly, of a person 
described in subparagraph (B), (C), (D), (E), or (G), or of the 
employee benefit plan; or 
(I) a 10 percent or more (directly or indirectly in capital or profits) 
partner or joint venturer of a person described in subparagraph (B), 
(C), (D), (E), or (G). 
The Secretary, after consultation and coordination with the Secretary of 
the Treasury, may by regulation prescribe a percentage lower than 50 
percent for subparagraph (E) and (G) and lower than 10 percent for 
subparagraph (H) or (I). The Secretary may prescribe regulations for 
determining the ownership (direct or indirect) of profits and beneficial 
interests, and the manner in which indirect stockholdings are taken into 
account. Any person who is a party in interest with respect to a plan to 
which a trust described in section 501(c)(22) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 501(c)(22)] is permitted to make payments 
under section 4223 [29 USCS § 1403] shall be treated as a party in 
interest with respect to such trust. 
(15) The term "relative" means a spouse, ancestor, lineal descendant, or 
spouse of a lineal descendant. 
(16)(A) The term "administrator" means— 
(i) the person specifically so designated by the terms of the 
instrument under which the plan is operated; 
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(ii) if an administrator is not so designated, the plan sponsor; or 
(iii) in the case of a plan for which an administrator is not 
designated and a plan sponsor cannot be identified, such other 
person as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe. 
(B) The term "plan sponsor" means (i) the employer in the case of an 
employee benefit plan established or maintained by a single employer, 
(ii) the employee organization in the case of a plan established or 
maintained by an employee organization, or (iii) in the case of a plan 
established or maintained by two or more employers or jointly by one 
or more employers and one or more employee organizations, the 
association, committee, joint board of trustees, or other similar group 
of representatives of the parties who establish or maintain the plan. 
(17) The term "separate account" means an account established or 
maintained by an insurance company under which income, gains, and 
losses, whether or not realized, from assets allocated to such account, 
are, in accordance with the applicable contract, credited to or charged 
against such account without regard to other income, gains, or losses of 
the insurance company. 
(18) The term "adequate consideration" when used in part 4 of subtitle 
B [29 USCS §§ 1101 et seq.] means (A) in. the case of a security for 
which there is a generally recognized market, either (i) the price of the 
security prevailing on a national securities exchange which is registered 
under section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 USCS § 78fj, 
or (ii) if the security is not traded on such a national securities 
exchange, a price not less favorable to the plan than the offering price 
for the security as established by the current bid and asked prices 
quoted by persons independent of the issuer and of any party in interest; 
and (B) in the case of an asset other than a security for which there is a 
generally recognized market, the fair market value of the asset as 
determined in good faith by the trustee or named fiduciary pursuant to 
the terms of the plan and in accordance with regulations promulgated 
by the Secretary. 
(19) The term "nonforfeitable" when used with respect to a pension 
benefit or right means a claim obtained by a participant or his benefi-
ciary to that part of an immediate or deferred benefit under a pension 
plan which arises from the participant's service, which is unconditional, 
and which is legally enforceable against the plan. For purposes of this 
paragraph, a right to an accrued benefit derived from employer contribu-
tions shall not be treated as forfeitable merely because the plan contains 
a provision described in section 203(a)(3) [29 USCS § 1053(a)(3)]. 
(20) The term "security" has the same meaning as such term has under 
section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77b(l)). 
(21)(A) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a 
fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any 
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting manage-
ment of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting 
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management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment 
advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect 
to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or 
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan. Such 
term includes any person designated under section 405(c)(1)(B) [29 
USCS § 1105(c)(1)(B)]. 
(B) If any money or other property of an employee benefit plan is 
invested in securities issued by an investment company registered 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, such investment shall 
not by itself cause such investment company or such investment 
company's investment adviser or principal underwriter to be deemed 
to be a fiduciary or a party in interest as those terms are defined in 
this title, except insofar as such investment company or its investment 
adviser or principal underwriter acts in connection with an employee 
benefit plan covering employees of the investment company, the 
investment adviser, or its principal underwriter. Nothing contained in 
this subparagraph shall limit the duties imposed on such investment 
company, investment adviser, or principal underwriter by any other 
law. 
(22) The term "normal retirement benefit,, means the greater of the 
early retirement benefit under the plan, or the benefit under the plan 
commencing at normal retirement age. The normal retirement benefit 
shall be determined without regard to— 
(A) medical benefits, and 
(B) disability benefits not in excess of the qualified disability benefit. 
For purposes of this paragraph, a qualified disability benefit is a 
disability benefit provided by a plan which does not exceed the benefit 
which would be provided for the participant if he separated from the 
service at normal retirement age. For purposes of this paragraph, the 
early retirement benefit under a plan shall be determined without regard 
to any benefit under the plan which the Secretary of the Treasury finds 
to be a benefit described in section 204(b)(1)(G) [29 USCS 
§ 1054(b)(1)(G)]. 
(23) The term "accrued benefit" means— 
(A) in the case of a defined benefit plan, the individual's accrued 
benefit determined under the plan and, except as provided in section 
204(c)(3) [29 USCS § 1054(c)(3)], expressed in the form of an amiual 
benefit commencing at normal retirement age, or 
(B) in the case of a plan which is an individual account plan, the 
balance of the individual's account. 
The accrued benefit of an employee shall not be less than the amount 
determined under section 204(c)(2)(B) [29 USCS § 1054(c)(2)(B)] with re-
spect to the employee's accumulated contribution. 
(24) The term "normal retirement age" means the earlier of— 
(A) the time a plan participant attains normal retirement age under 
the plan, or 
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(El) the later of— 
(i) the time a plan participant attains age 65, or 
(ii) the 5th anniversary of the time a plan participant commenced 
participation in the plan. 
(25) The term "vested liabilities" means the present value of the 
immediate or deferred benefits available at noimal retirement age for 
participants and their beneficiaries which are nonforfeitable. 
(26) The term "current value" means fair market value where available 
and otherwise the fair value as determined in good faith by a trustee or 
a named fiduciary (as defined in section 402(a)(2) [29 USCS 
§ 1102(a)(2)]) pursuant to the terms of the plan and in accordance with 
regulations of the Secretary, assuming an orderly liquidation at the time 
of such determination. 
(27) The term "present value", with respect to a liability, means the 
value adjusted to reflect anticipated events. Such adjustments shall 
conform to such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may 
prescribe. 
(28) The term "normal service cost" or "normal cost" means the annual 
cost of future pension benefits and administrative expenses assigned, 
under an actuarial cost method, to years subsequent to a particular 
valuation date of a pension plan. The Secretary of the Treasury may 
prescribe regulations to carry out this paragraph. 
(29) The term "accrued liability" means the excess of the present value, 
as of a particular valuation date of a pension plan, of the projected 
future benefit costs and administrative expenses for all plan participants 
and beneficiaries over the present value of future contributions for the 
normal cost of all applicable plan participants and beneficiaries. The 
Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe regulations to carry out this 
paragraph. 
(30) The term "unfunded accrued liability" means the excess of the 
accrued liability, under an actuarial cost method which so provides, over 
the present value of the assets of a pension plan. The Secretary of the 
Treasury may prescribe regulations to carry out this paragraph. 
(31) The term "advance funding actuarial cost method" or "actuarial 
cost method" means a recognized actuarial technique utilized for estab-
lishing the amount and incidence of the annual actuarial cost of pension 
plan benefits and expenses. Acceptable actuarial cost methods shall 
include the accrued benefit cost method (unit credit method), the entry 
age normal cost method, the individual level premium cost method, the 
aggregate cost method, the attained age normal cost method, and the 
frozen initial liability cost method. The terminal funding cost method 
and the current funding (pay-as-you-go) cost method are not acceptable 
actuarial cost methods. The Secretary of the Treasury shall issue 
regulations to further define acceptable actuarial cost methods. 
(32) The term "governmental plan" means a plan established or main-
tained for its employees by the Government of the United States, by the 
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government of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any 
agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing. The term "govern-
mental plan" also includes any plan to which the Railroad Retirement 
Act of 1935 or 1937 applies, and which is financed by contributions 
required under that Act and any plan of an international organization 
which is exempt from taxation under the provisions of the International 
Organizations Immunities Act (59 Stat. 669). 
(33)(A) The term "church plan" means a plan established and main-
tained (to the extent required in clause (ii) of subparagraph (B)) for 
its employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention 
or association of churches which is exempt from tax under section 
501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 501]. 
(B) The term "church plan" does not include a plan— 
(i) which is established and maintained primarily for the benefit of 
employees (or their beneficiaries) of such church or convention or 
association of churches who are employed in connection with one 
or more unrelated trades or businesses (within the meaning of 
section 513 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS 
§513]), or 
(ii) if less than substantially all of the individuals included in the 
plan are individuals described in subparagraph (A) or in clause (ii) 
of subparagraph (C) (or their beneficiaries). 
(C) For purposes of this paragraph— 
(i) A plan established and maintained for its employees (or their 
beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of 
churches includes a plan maintained by an organization, whether a 
civil law corporation or otherwise, the principal purpose or func-
tion of which is the administration or funding of a plan or program 
for the provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or both, 
for the employees of a church or a convention or association of 
churches, if such organization is controlled by or associated with a 
church or a convention or association of churches, 
(ii) The term employee of a church or a convention or association 
of churches includes— 
(I) a duly ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a 
church in the exercise of his ministry, regardless of the source of 
his compensation; 
(II) an employee of an organization, whether a civil law corpora-
tion or otherwise, which is exempt from tax under section 501 of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 501] and which 
is controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or 
association of churches; and 
(III) an individual described in clause (v). 
(iii) A church or a convention or association of churches which is 
exempt from tax under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code 
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of 1986 [26 USCS § 501] shall be deemed the employer of any 
individual included as an employee under clause (ii). 
(iv) An organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, 
is associated with a church or a convention or association of 
churches if it shares common religious bonds and convictions with 
that church or convention or association of churches, 
(v) If an employee who is included in a church plan separates from 
the service of a church or a convention or association of churches 
or an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, 
which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 501] and which is controlled by 
or associated with a church or a convention or association of 
churches, the church plan shall not fail to meet the requirements of 
this paragraph merely because the plan— 
(I) retains the employee's accrued benefit or account for the 
payment of benefits to the employee or his beneficiaries pursuant 
to the terms of the plan; or 
(II) receives contributions on the employee's behalf after the 
employee's separation from such service, but only for a period of 
5 years after such separation, unless the employee is disabled 
(within the meaning of the disability provisions of the church 
plan or, if there are no such provisions in the church plan, 
within the meaning of section 72(m)(7) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 72(m)(7)] at the time of such separa-
tion from service. 
(D)(i) If a plan established and maintained for its employees (or their 
beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of 
churches which is exempt from tax under section 501 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 501] fails to meet one 
or more of the requirements of this paragraph and corrects its 
failure to meet such requirements within the correction period, the 
plan shall be deemed to meet the requirements of this paragraph 
for the year in which the correction was made and for all prior 
years. 
(ii) If a correction is not made within the correction period, the 
plan shall be deemed not to meet; the requirements of this para-
graph beginning with the date on which the earliest failure to meet 
one or more of such requirements occurred. 
(iii) For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "correction 
period" means— 
(I) the period ending 270 days after the date of mailing by the 
Secretary of the Treasury of a notice of default with respect to 
the plan's failure to meet one or more of the requirements of this 
paragraph; or 
(II) any period set by a court of competent jurisdiction after a 
final determination that the plan fails to meet such requirements, 
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or, if the court does not specify such period, any reasonable 
period determined by the Secretary of the Treasury on the basis 
of all the facts and circumstances, but in any event not less than 
270 days after the determination has become final; or 
(III) any additional period which the Secretary of the Treasury 
determines is reasonable or necessary for the correction of the 
default, 
whichever has the latest ending date. 
(34) The term "individual account plan" or "defined contribution plan" 
means a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each 
participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to 
the participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, 
and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be 
allocated to such participant's account. 
(35) The term "defined benefit plan" means a pension plan other than 
an individual account plan; except that a pension plan which is not an 
individual account plan and which provides a benefit derived from 
employer contributions which is based panly on the balance of the 
separate account of a participant— 
(A) for the purposes of section 202 [29 USCS § 1052], shall be treated 
as an individual account plan, and 
(B) for the purposes of paragraph (23) of this section and section 204 
[29 USCS § 1054], shall be treated as an individual account plan to 
the extent benefits are based upon the separate account of a partici-
pant and as a defined benefit plan with respect to the remaining 
portion of benefits under the plan. 
(36) The term "excess benefit plan" means a plan maintained by an 
employer solely for the purpose of providing benefits for certain employ-
ees in excess of the limitations on contributions and benefits imposed by 
section 415 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 415] on 
plans to which that section applies, without regard to whether the plan 
is funded. To the extent that a separable part of a plan (as determined 
by the Secretary of Labor) maintained by an employer is maintained for 
such purpose, that part shall be treated as a separate plan which is an 
excess benefit plan. 
(37)(A) The term "multiemployer plan" means a plan— 
(i) to which more than one employer is required to contribute, 
(ii) which is maintained pursuant to one or more collective bargain-
ing agreements between one or more employee organizations and 
more than one employer, and 
(iii) which satisfies such other requirements as the Secretary may 
prescribe by regulation. 
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, all trades or businesses (whether 
or not incorporated) which are under common control within the 
meaning of section 4001(b)(1) [29 USCS § 1301(b)(1)] are considered 
a single employer. 
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(C) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), a plan is a multiemployer 
plan on and after its termination date if the plan was a multiemployer 
plan under this paragraph for the plan year preceding its termination 
date. 
(D) For purposes of this title, notwithstanding the preceding provi-
sions of this paragraph, for any plan year which began before the date 
of the enactment of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments 
Act of 1980 [enacted Sept. 26, 1980], the term "multiemployer plan" 
means a plan described in section 3(37) of this Act [para. (37) of this 
section] as in effect immediately before such date. 
(E) Within one year after the date of the enactment of the Multiem-
ployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 [enacted Sept. 26, 
1980], a multiemployer plan may irrevocably elect, pursuant to 
procedures established by the corporation and subject to the provi-
sions of sections 4403 [4303](b) and (c) [29 USCS § 1453(b) and (c)], 
that the plan shall not be treated as a multiemployer plan for all 
purposes under this Act or the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 
USCS §§ 1 et seq.] if for each of the last 3 plan years ending prior to 
the effective date of the Multiemplover Pension Plan Amendments 
Act of 1980— 
(i) the plan was not a multiemployer plan because the plan was not 
a plan described in section 3(37)(A)(iii) of this Act [para. 
(37)(A)(iii) of this section] and section 414(f)(1)(C) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 [26 USCS § 414(f)(1)(C)] (as such provisions 
were in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of the 
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 [enacted 
Sept. 26, 1980]); and 
(ii) the plan had been identified as a plan that was not a multiem-
ployer plan in substantially all its filings with the corporation, the 
Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of the Treasury. 
(F)(i) For purposes of this title a qualified football coaches plan— 
(I) shall be treated as a multiemployer plan to the extent not 
inconsistent with the purposes of this subparagraph; and 
(II) notwithstanding section 401(k)(4)(B) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 401(k)(4)(B)], may include a 
qualified cash and deferred arrangement. 
(ii) For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "qualified football 
coaches plan" means any defined contribution plan which is estab-
lished and maintained by an organization— 
(I) which is described in section 501(c) of such Code [26 USCS 
§ 501(c)]; 
(II) the membership of which consists entirely of individuals 
who primarily coach football as full-time employees of 4-year 
colleges or universities described in section 170(b)(l)(A)(ii) of 
such Code [26 USCS § 170(b)(l)(A)(ii)]; and 
(III) which was in existence on September 18, 1986. 
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(38) The term "investment manager" means any fiduciary (other than a 
trustee or named fiduciary, as defined in section 402(a)(2) [29 USCS 
§ 1102(a)(2)])-
(A) who has the power to manage, acquire, or dispose of any asset of 
a plan; 
(B) who is (i) registered as an investment adviser under the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940 [15 USCS §§ 80b-1 et seq.]; (ii) is a bank, 
as defined in that Act [15 USCS §§ 80b-1 et seq.]; or (iii) is an 
insurance company qualified to perform services described in subpara-
graph (A) under the laws of more than one State; and 
(C) has acknowledged in writing that he is a fiduciary with respect to 
the plan. 
(39) The terms "plan year" and "fiscal year of the plan" mean, with 
respect to a plan, the calendar, policy, or fiscal year on which the 
records of the plan are kept. 
(40)(A) The term "multiple employer welfare arrangement" means an 
employee welfare benefit plan, or any other arrangement (other than 
an employee welfare benefit plan), which is established or maintained 
for the purpose of offering or providing any benefit described in 
paragraph (1) to the employees of two or more employers (including 
one or more self-employed individuals), or to their beneficiaries, 
except that such term does not include any such plan or other 
arrangement which is established or maintained— 
(i) under or pursuant to one or more agreements which the 
Secretary finds to be collective bargaining agreements, or 
(ii) by a rural electric cooperative. 
(B) For purposes of this paragraph— 
(i) two or more trades or businesses, whether or not incorporated, 
shall be deemed a single employer if such trades or businesses are 
within the same control group, 
(ii) the term "control group" means a g^oup of trades or businesses 
under common control, 
(iii) the determination of whether a trade or business is under 
"common control" with another trade or business shall be deter-
mined under regulations of the Secretary applying principles similar 
to the principles applied in determining whether employees of two 
or more trades or businesses are treated as employed by a single 
employer under section 4001(b) [29 USCS § 1301(b)], except that, 
for purposes of this paragraph, common control shall not be based 
on an interest of less than 25 percent, and 
(iv) the term "rural electric cooperative" means— 
(I) any organization which is exempt from tax under section 
501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 501(a)] 
and which is engaged primarily in providing electric service on a 
mutual or cooperative basis, and 
124 
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY 29 USCS § 1002 
(II) any organization described in paragraph (4) or (6) of section 
501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS 
§ 501(c)(4) or (6)] which is exempt from tax under section 501(a) 
of such Code [26 USCS § 501(a)] and at least 80 percent of the 
members of which are organizations described in subclause (I). 
(41) Single-employer plan. The term "single-employer plan" means an 
employee benefit plan other than a multiemployer plan. 
(Sept. 2, 1974, P. L. 93-406, Title I, Subtitle A, § 3, 88 Stat. 833; Sept. 26, 
1980, P. L. 96-364, Title III, §§ 302, 305, Title IV, §§ 407(a), 409, 94 Stat. 
1291, 1294, 1303, 1307; Jan. 14, 1983, P. L. 97-473, Title III, § 302(a), 96 
Stat. 2612; Apr. 7, 1986, P. L. 99-272, Title XI, § 11016(c)(1), 100 Stat. 
273; Oct. 21, 1986, P. L. 99-509, Title IX, Subtitle C, § 9203(b)(1), 100 
Stat. 1979; Oct. 22, 1986, P. L. 99-514, Title XVIII, Subtitle A, Ch 7, 
§ 1879(u)(3), 100 Stat. 2913; Dec. 22, 1987, P. L. 100-202, § 136(a), 101 
Stat. 1329-441; Dec. 19, 1989, P. L. 101-239, Title VII, Subtitle G, Part V, 
Subpart B, § 7871(b)(2), Subpart C, § 7881(m)(2)(D), Subpart D, 
§§ 7891(a)(1), 7893(a), 7894(a)(1)(A), (2)(A), (3), (4), 103 Stat. 2435, 2444, 
2445, 2447, 2448.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
References in text: 
"This title", referred to in this section, is Title I of Act Sept. 2, 1974, 
P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832, popularly known as the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, which appears generally as 29 
USCS § 1001-§ 1168. For full classification of this Title, consult USCS 
Tables volumes. 
"This Act", referred to in this section, is the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, Act Sept. 2, 1974, P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829, which appears generally as 29 USCS §§ 1001 et seq. For full 
classification of this Act, consult USCS Tables volumes. 
"The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act", referred to in this section, is 
Act Aug. 7, 1953, ch 345, 67 Stat. 462, which is generally classified to 
43 USCS §§1331 et seq. For full classification of this Act, consult 
USCS Tables volumes. 
"The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947", referred to in this 
section, is Act June 23, 1947, ch 120, 61 Stat. 136, and appears 
generally as 29 USCS §§ 141 et seq. For full classification of such Act, 
consult USCS Tables volumes. 
"The Railway Labor Act", referred to in this section, is Act May 20, 
1926, ch 347, 44 Stat. 577, and appears generally as 45 USCS §§ 151 et 
seq. For full classification of such Act, consult USCS Tables volumes. 
"The Investment Company Act of 1940", referred to in this section, is 
Act Aug. 22, 1940, ch 686, Title I, 54 Stat. 789, and appears generally 
as 15 USCS §§ 80a-1 et seq. For full classification of such Act, consult 
USCS Tables volumes. 
"The Railroad Retirement Act of 1935 or 1937" or "that Act", 
referred to in this section, is Act Aug. 29, 1935, ch 812, 49 Stat. 867, 
as amended generally by Act June 24, 1937, ch 382, Part 1, 50 Stat. 
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INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
In prosecution for embezzling funds from 
employee pension benefit plan, whether or not 
particular fund was "employee pension benefit 
fund/* as denned in predecessor of this section 
(29 USCS § 1002), was question for jury under 
proper instructions. United States v Daley (1972, 
CA1 Mass) 454 F2d 505. 
Congress did not intend, by enactment of 
predecessor of reporting and disclosure provi-
sions of this Act (29 USCS §§ 1021 et seq.), to 
confer upon courts broad regulatory power over 
operation of welfare funds. Moyer v Kirkpatnck 
(1967, ED Pa) 265 F Supp 348, 64 BNA LRRM 
2669, 55 CCH LC « 11832, affd (CA3 Pa) 387 
F2d 955, 67 BNA LRRM 2139, 57 CCH LC 
«[ 12396. 
Fund trustees are granted stay against discov-
ery in civil action brought by Secretary for 
breach of fiduciary duties pending outcome of 
Attorney General's investigation suggesting gov-
ernment is preparing to prosecute trustees under 
29 USCS § 1131 since possibility trustees would 
be unable to defend both actions to fullest since 
repeated invocation of right against self-incrimi-
nation would hamper ability to defend civil suit 
outweighs nsk of harm to public interest in 
correcting improprieties m trust management. 
Brock v Tolkow (1985, ED NY) 109 FRD 116, 
6 EBC 2673. 
§ 1132. Civil enforcement 
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action may be 
brought— 
(1) by a participant or beneficiary— 
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or 
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to 
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights 
to future benefits under the terms of the plan; 
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for 
appropriate relief under section 409 [29 USCS § 1109]; 
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or 
practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the 
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress 
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms 
of the plan; 
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate 
relief in the case of a violation of 105(c) [29 USCS § 1025(c)]; 
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), by the Secretary (A) 
to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title, or 
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such 
violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this title; or 
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (c)(2) 
or (i) or (1). 
(b) Plans qualified under Internal Revenue Code; maintenance of actions 
involving delinquent contributions. (1) In the case of a plan which is 
qualified under section 401(a), 403(a), or 405(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 (or with respect to which an application to so qualify has 
been filed and has not been finally determined) the Secretary may 
exercise his authority under subsection (a)(5) with respect to a violation 
of, or the enforcement of, parts 2 and 3 of this subtitle [29 USCS 
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§§ 1051 et seq., §§ 1081 et seq.] (relating to participation, vesting, and 
funding), only if— 
(A) requested by the Secretary of the Treasury, or 
(B) one or more participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries, of such plan 
request in writing (in such manner as the Secretary shall prescribe by 
regulation) that he exercise such authority on their behalf. In the case 
of such a request under this paragraph he may exercise such authority 
only if he determines that such violation affects, or such enforcement 
is necessary to protect, claims of participants or beneficiaries to 
benefits under the plan. 
(2) The Secretary shall not initiate an action to enforce section 515 [29 
USCS § 1145]. 
(c) Administrator's refusal to supply requested information; penalty for 
failure to provide annual report in complete form. (1) Any administrator 
(A) who fails to meet the requirements of paragraph (1) or (4) of section 
606 [29 USCS §1166(1) or (4)] with respect to a participant or 
beneficiary, or (B) who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any 
information which such administrator is required by this title to furnish 
to a participant or beneficiary (unless such failure or refusal results from 
matters reasonably beyond the control of the administrator) by mailing 
the material requested to the last known address of the requesting 
participant or beneficiary within 30 days after such request may in the 
court's discretion be personally liable to such participant or beneficiary 
in the amount of up to SI00 a day from the date of such failure or 
refusal, and the court may in its discretion order such other relief as it 
deems proper. 
(2) The Secretary may assess a civil penalty against any plan administra-
tor of up to S 1,000 a day from the date of such plan administrator's 
failure or refusal to file the annual report required to be filed with the 
Secretary under section 101(b)(4) [29 USCS § 1021(b)(4)]. For purposes 
of this paragraph, an annual report that has been rejected under section 
104(a)(4) [29 USCS § 1024(a)(4)] for failure to provide material informa-
tion shall not be treated as having been filed with the Secretary. 
(3) Any employer maintaining a plan who fails to meet the notice 
requirement of section 101(d) [29 USCS § 1021(d)] with respect to any 
participant or beneficiary may in the court's discretion be liable to such 
participant or beneficiary in the amount of up to $100 a day from the 
date of such failure, and the court may in its discretion order such other 
relief as it deems proper. 
(d) Status of employee benefit plan as entity. (1) An employee benefit plan 
may sue or be sued under this title as an entity. Service of summons, 
subpena, or other legal process of a court upon a trustee or an 
administrator of an employee benefit plan in his capacity as such shall 
constitute service upon the employee benefit plan. In a case where a plan 
has not designated in the summary plan description of the plan an 
individual as agent for the service of legal process, service upon the 
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Secretary shall constitute such service. The Secretary, not later than 15 
days after receipt of service under the preceding sentence, shall notify 
the administrator or any trustee of the plan of receipt of such service. 
(2) Any money judgment under this title against an employee benefit 
plan shall be enforceable only against the plan as an entity and shall not 
be enforceable against any other person unless liability against such 
person is established in his individual capacity under this title. 
(e) Jurisdiction. (1) Except for actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this 
section, the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of civil actions under this title brought by the Secretary or 
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. State courts of competent 
jurisdiction and district courts of the United States shall have concurrent 
jurisdiction of actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section. 
(2) Where an action under this title is brought in a district court of the 
United States, it may be brought in the distnct where the plan is 
administered, where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides 
or may be found, and process may be served in any other distnct where 
a defendant resides or may be found. 
(f) Amount in controversy; citizenship of parties. The distnct courts of the 
United States shall have junsdiction, without respect to the amount m 
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to grant the relief provided for 
in subsection (a) of this section in any action. 
(g) Attorney's fees and costs; awards in actions involving delinquent 
contributions. (1) In any action under this title (other than an action 
described in paragraph 2) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the 
court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of 
action to either party. 
(2) In any action under this title by a fiduciary for or on behalf of a plan 
to enforce section 515 [29 USCS § 1145] in which a judgment in favor of 
the plan is awarded, the court shall award the plan— 
(A) the unpaid contributions, 
(B) interest on the unpaid contributions, 
(C) an amount equal to the greater of— 
(i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or 
(ii) liquidated damages provided for under the plan in an amount 
not in excess of 20 percent (or such higher percentage as may be 
permitted under Federal or State law) of the amount determined by 
the court under subparagraph (A), 
(D) reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the action, to be paid by 
the defendant, and 
(E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. 
For purposes of this paragraph, interest on unpaid contnbutions shall be 
determined by using the rate provided under the plan, or, if none, the 
rate prescribed under section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
[26 USCS § 6621]. 
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(h) Service upon Secretary of Labor and Secretary of the Treasury. A 
copy of the complaint in any action under this title by a participant, 
beneficiary, or fiduciary (other than an action brought by one or more 
participants or beneficiaries under subsection (a)(1)(B) which is solely for 
the purpose of recovering benefits due such participants under the terms of 
the plan) shall be served upon the Secretary and the Secretary of the 
Treasury by certified mail. Either Secretary shall have the right in his 
discretion to intervene in any action, except that the Secretary of the 
Treasury may not intervene in any action under part 4 of this subtitle [29 
USCS §§ 1101 et seq.]. If the Secretary brings an action under subsection 
(a) on behalf of a participant or beneficiary, he shall notify the Secretary of 
the Treasury. 
(i) Administrative assessment of civil penalty. In the case of a transaction 
prohibited by section 406 [29 USCS § 1106] by a party in interest with 
respect to a plan to which this part applies, the Secretary may assess a civil 
penalty against such party in interest. The amount of such penalty may not 
exceed 5 percent of the amount involved in each such transaction (as 
defined in section 4975(f)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 
USCS § 4975(f)(4)]) for each year or part thereof during which the 
prohibited transaction continues, except that, if the transaction is not 
corrected (in such manner as the Secretary shall prescribe in regulations 
which shall be consistent with section 4975(f)(5) of such Code [26 USCS 
§ 4975(f)(5)]) within 90 days after notice from the Secretary (or such 
longer period as the Secretary may permit), such penalty may be in an 
amount not more than 100 percent of the amount: involved. This subsec-
tion shall not applv to a transaction with respect to a plan described in 
section 4975(e)(1) of such Code [26 USCS § 4975(e)(1)]. 
(j) Direction and control of litigation by Attorney General. In all civil 
actions under this title, attorneys appointed by the Secretary may represent 
the Secretary (except as provided in section 518(a) of title 28, United States 
Code), but all such litigation shall be subject to the direction and control 
of the Attorney General. 
(k) Jurisdiction of actions against the Secretary of Labor. Suits by an 
administrator, fiduciary, participant, or beneficiary of an employee benefit 
plan to review a final order of the Secretary, to restrain the Secretary from 
taking any action contrary to the provisions of this Act, or to compel him 
to take action required under this title, may be brought in the district court 
of the United States for the district where the plan has its principal office, 
or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 
(1) Civil penalties on violations by fiduciaries. (l)In the case of— 
(A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under (or other violation of) 
part 4 [29 USCS §§ 1101 et seq.] by a fiduciary, or 
(B) any knowing participation in such a breach or violation by any 
other person, 
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the Secretary shall assess a civil penalty against such fiduciary or other 
person in an amount equal to 20 percent of the applicable recovery 
amount. 
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "applicable recovery 
amount" means any amount which is recovered from a fiduciary or 
other person with respect to a breach or violation described in para-
graph (1)— 
(A) pursuant to any settlement agreement with the Secretary, or 
(B) ordered by a court to be paid by such fiduciary or other person to 
a plan or its participants and beneficiaries in a judicial proceeding 
instituted by the Secretary under subsection (a)(2) or (a)(5). 
(3) The Secretary may, in the Secretary's sole discretion, waive or reduce 
the penalty under paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines in writing 
that— 
(A) the fiduciary or other person acted reasonably and in good faith, 
or 
(B) it is reasonable to expect that the fiduciary or other person will 
not be able tc restore all losses to the plan without severe financial 
hardship unless such waiver or reduction is granted. 
(4) The penalty imposed on a fiduciary or other person under this 
subsection with respect to any transaction shall be reduced by the 
amount of any penalty or tax imposed on such fiduciary or other person 
with respect to such transaction under subsection (i) of this section and 
section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 USCS § 4975]. 
(Sept. 2, 1974, P. L. 93-406, Title I, Subtitle B, Part 5, § 502, 88 Stat. 891; 
Sept. 26, 1980, P. L. 96-364, Title III, § 306(b), 94 Stat. 1295; Apr. 7, 
1986, P. L. 99-272, Title X, § 10002(b), 100 Stat. 231; Dec. 22, 1987, P. L. 
100-203, Title IX, Subtitle D, Part II, Subpart D, §§ 9342(c), 9344, 101 
Stat. 1330-372, 1330-373, Dec. 19, 1989, P. L. 101-239, Title II, Subtitle B, 
§ 2101(a), (b), Title VII, Subtitle G, Pan V, Subpart C § 7881(b)(5)(B), 
(j)(2), (3), Subpart D, §§ 7891(a)(1), 7894(f)(1), 103 Stat. 2123, 2438, 2442, 
2445, 2450.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
References in text: 
"This title", referred to in this section, is Title I of Act Sept. 2, 1974, 
P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832, popularly known as the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, which appears generally as 29 
USCS §§ 1001 et seq. For full classification of this Title, consult USCS 
Tables volumes. 
"This part", referred to in this section, is Part 5 of Subtitle B of Title I 
of Act Sept. 2, 1974, P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat 891, popularly known as the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, which appears 
generally as 29 USCS §§ 1131 et seq. For full classification of this Part, 
consult USCS Tables volumes. 
"This Act", referred to in this section, is the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, Act Sept. 2, 1974, P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
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The Comptroller General shall not disclose the identity of any individual 
or employer in making any information obtained under this subsection 
available to the public. 
(3) Definitions. For purposes of this subsection, the terms "employee 
benefit plan", "participant", "administrator", "beneficiary", "plan spon-
sor", "employee", and "employer" are defined in section 3 of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [29 USCS § 1002]. 
(Apr. 7, 1986, P. L. 99-272, Title XI, § 11016(d)(l)-(3), 100 Stat. 275.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Explanatory notes: 
This section was enacted as part of Act Apr. 7, 1986, P. L. 99-272, 
Title XI, popularly known as the Single-Employer Pension Plan 
Amendments Act of 1986, and not as part of Act Sept. 2, 1974, P. L. 
93-406, which is popularly known as the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act, and which generally comprises this chapter. 
Effective date of section: 
Apr. 7, 1986, P. L. 99-272, Title XI, § 11016(d)(4), 100 Stat. 275, 
provided: "The preceding provisions of this subsection [adding this 
section] shall be effective on the date of the enactment of this Act 
[enacted Apr. 7, 1986].". 
Other provisions: 
Application of section. For provisions as to the application of this 
section, see Act Apr. 7, 1986, P. L. 99-272, Title XI, § 11019 in part, 
which appears as 29 USCS § 1341 note. 
§ 1144. Other laws 
(a) Supersedure; effective date. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section, the provisions of this title and title IV shall supersede any and all 
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan described in section 4(a) [29 USCS § 1003(a)] and not exempt 
under section 4(b) [29 USCS § 1003(b)]. This section shall take effect on 
January 1, 1975. 
(b) Construction and application. (1) This section shall not apply with 
respect to any cause of action which arose, or any act or omission which 
occurred, before January 1, 1975. 
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this title shall 
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any 
State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities. 
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) [29 
USCS § 1003(a)], which is not exempt under section 4(b) [29 USCS 
§ 1003(b)] (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose of 
providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, 
shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, 
trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the 
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business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State 
purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, 
banks, trust companies, or investment companies. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit use by the 
Secretary of services or facilities of a State agency as permitted under 
section 506 of this Act [29 USCS § 1136]. 
(4) Subsection (a) shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal 
law of a State. 
(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), subsection (a) shall not 
apply to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act (Haw. Rev. Stat. 
§§393-1 through 393-51). 
(B) Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall be construed to exempt from 
subsection (a)— 
(i) any State tax law relating to employee benefit plans, or 
(ii) any amendment of the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act 
enacted after September 2, 1974, to the extent it provides for more 
than the effective administration of such Act as in effect on such 
date. 
(C) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), parts 1 and 4 of this subtitle 
[29 USCS §§ 1021 et seq., 1101 et seq.], and the preceding sections of 
this part [29 USCS §§ 1131 et seq.] to the extent they govern matters 
which are governed by the provisions of such parts 1 and 4 [29 USCS 
§§ 1021 et seq., 1101 et seq.], shall supersede the Hawaii Prepaid 
Health Care Act (as in effect on or after the date of the enactment of 
this paragraph [enacted Jan. 14, 1983]), but the Secretary may enter 
into cooperative arrangements under this paragraph and section 506 
[29 USCS § 1136] with officials of the State of Hawaii to assist them 
in effectuating the policies of provisions of such Act which are 
superseded by such parts 1 and 4 [29 USCS §§ 1021 et seq., 1101 et 
seq.] and the preceding sections of this part [29 USCS § 1131 et seq.]. 
(6)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section— 
(i) in the case of an employee welfare benefit plan which is a 
multiple employer welfare arrangement and is fully insured (or 
which is a multiple employer welfare arrangement subject to an 
exemption under- subparagraph (B)), any law of any State which 
regulates insurance may apply to such arrangement to the extent 
that such law provides— 
(I) standards, requiring the maintenance of specified levels of 
reserves and specified levels of contributions, which any such 
plan, or any trust established under such a plan, must meet in 
order to be considered under such law able to pay benefits in full 
when due, and 
(II) provisions to enforce such standards, and 
(ii) in the case of any other employee welfare benefit plan which is 
a multiple employer welfare arrangement, in addition to this title, 
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any law of any State which regulates Insurance may apply to the 
extent not inconsistent with the preceding sections of this title. 
(B) The Secretary may, under regulations which may be prescribed by 
the Secretary, exempt from subparagraph (A)(ii), individually or by 
class, multiple employer welfare arrangements which are not fully 
insured. Any such exemption may be granted with respect to any 
arrangement or class of arrangements only if such arrangement or 
each arrangement which is a member of such class meets the require-
ments of section 3(1) and section 4 [29 USCS §§ 1002(1), 1003] 
necessary to be considered an employee welfare benefit plan to which 
this title applies. 
(C) Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall affect the manner or extent to 
which the provisions of this title apply to an employee welfare benefit 
plan which is not a multiple employer welfare arrangement and which 
is a plan, fund, or program participating in, subscribing to, or 
otherwise using a multiple employer welfare arrangement to fund or 
administer benefits to such plan's participants and beneficiaries. 
(D) For purposes of this paragraph, a multiple employer welfare 
arrangement shall be considered fully insured only if the terms of the 
arrangement provide for benefits the amount of all of which the 
Secretary determines are guaranteed under a contract, or policy of 
insurance, issued by an insurance company, insurance service, or 
insurance organization, qualified to conduct business in a State. 
(7) Subsection (a) shall not apply to qualified domestic relations orders 
(within the meaning of section 206(d)(3)(B)(i) [29 USCS 
§ 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)]). 
(8) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any State law 
mandating that an employee benefit plan not include any provision 
which has the effect of limiting or excluding coverage or payment for 
any health care for an individual who would otherwise be covered or 
entitled to benefits or services under the terms of the employee benefit 
plan, because that individual is provided, or is eligible for, benefits or 
services pursuant to a plan under title XIX of the Social Security Act 
[42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], to the extent such law is necessary for the 
State to be eligible to receive reimbursement under title XIX of that Act 
[42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.]. 
(c) Definitions. For purposes of this section: 
(1) The term "State law" includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, 
or other State action having the effect of law, of any State. A law of the 
United States applicable only to the District of Columbia shall be 
treated as a State law rather than a law of the United States. 
(2) The term "State" includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, 
or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, 
directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans 
covered by this title. 
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(d) Alteration, amendment, modification, invalidation, impairment, or su-
persedure of any law of the United States prohibited. Nothing in this title 
shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede 
any law of the United. States (except as provided in sections 111 and 507(b) 
[29 USCS §§ 1031, 1137(b)]) or any rule or regulation issued under any 
such law. 
(Sept. 2, 1974, P. L. 93-406, Title I, Subtitle B, Part 5, § 514, 88 Stat. 897; 
Jan. 14, 1983, P.L. 97-473, Title III, §§ 301(a), 302(b), 96 Stat. 2611, 2613; 
Aug. 23, 1984, P. L. 98-397, Title I, § 104(b), 98 Stat. 1436; Apr. 7, 1986, 
P. L. 99-272, Title IX, Subtitle B, § 9503(d)(1), 100 Stat. 207; Dec. 19, 
1989, P. L. 101-239, Title VII, Subtitle G, Part V, Subpart D, 
§ 7894(f)(2)(A),(3)(A), 103 Stat. 2450, 2451.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
References in text: 
"This title", referred to in this section, is Title I of Act Sept. 2, 1974, 
P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832, popularly known as the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, which appears generally as 29 
USCS §§ 1001 et seq. For full classification of this Title, consult USCS 
Tables volumes. 
"Title IV", referred to in this section, is Title IV of Act Sept. 2, 1974, 
P. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 1003, popularly known and the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, and appears generally as 29 
USCS 1301 et seq. For full classification of such Title, consult USCS 
Tables volumes. 
Amendments: 
1983. Act Jan. 14, 1983 (effective on the date of enactment on 1/14/83, 
as provided by § 301(c) of such Act), in subsec. (b), added para. (5). 
Such Act further (effective on the date of enactment on 1/14/83, as 
provided by § 302(c) of such Act, which appears as 29 USCS § 1002 
note), in subsec. (b), added para. (6). 
1984. Act Aug. 23, 1984, in subsec. (b), added para. (7). 
1986. Act Apr. 7, 1986 (effective as provided in § 9503(d)(2) of such 
Act, which appears as a note to this section), in subsec. (b), added 
para. (8). 
1989. Act Dec. 19, 1989 (effective as provided by § 7894(f)(2)(B) of 
such Act, which appears as a note to this section), in subsec. (b)(5)(C), 
substituted "such parts 1 and 4 and the preceding sections of this part" 
for "such parts". 
Such Act further (effective as provided by § 7894(f)(3)(B) of such Act, 
which appears as a note to this section) in subsec. (b)(6)(B), substituted 
"section 3(1)" for "section 3(1)". 
Other provisions: 
Promulgation of regulations. For provisions authorizing the Secretary 
to promulgate regulations, see 29 USCS § 1031. 
Treatment of other State laws. Act Jan. 14, 1983, P.L. 97-473, Title 
III, § 301(b), 96 Stat. 2611, effective on the date of enactment on Jan. 
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e- />_dwg ompiov^eo miO1; become ;nsu<ed. The Employer acknowledges oca understands Wo: if any of the info—ction 
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ADDENDUM C 
LAW OFFICES 
WILKINS, ORITT & RONNOW 
SUITE 8 5 0 
TWO FIFTY SEVEN TOWERS 
2 5 7 EAST EOO SOUTH-2 
M.CHAEL J. W.LK.NS. P.C S A L T ^ K E C , T Y ' U T A H 84111-2048 OF COUNSEL 
JEFFREY R. OR.TT TELEPHONE * °" H E A 0 M A N « J R ' 
LOR.N D. RONNOW. P.C. <80,> 53^ 7575 R O B E R T S" H O W C L U P - C 
KENDALL S. PETERSON 
DEBBIE A. ROBB FACSIMILE 
(80II 531-7577 
August 31, 1990 
VIA FAX 
375-3067 
Jeffery C. Peatross, Esq. 
Ivie & Young 
4 8 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: Jackie Robertson and Craig Robertson v. Gem Insurance 
Company 
Civil No, CV 891505 
Our File No. 740.037 
Dear Jeff: 
I have confirmed with Jeff Gabardi at Gem Insurance Company 
the compromise we worked out on the telephone earlier today. He 
will have ready on September 6, 1990, a check in the amount of 
$13,764.22, made out to the Plaintiffs and you jointly (unless you 
prefer it made out another way). The $13,764.22 is broken down as 
follows: 
1. Medical Benefits - $8,092*46 
2. Prejudgment Interest 
from April 1, 1989 
to September 6, 1990 - $1,160.01 
3. Attorneys1 Fees - $4,192.50 
4. Taxable Costs - $319.25 
Total $13,764.22 
If any of the above is not your understanding, please call me. 
If it is, you will be sending me an amended Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements. You also agreed to change your proposed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment as follows: 
Jeffery C. Peatross, Esq. 
August 31, 1990 
Page 2 
1. At page 3, Finding 11 will read as follows: 
Gem; Insurance Company admits 
receiving Dr. Adams' letter but 
relied upon the hospital records and 
continued to maintain that Mrs. 
Robertson's condition was pre-
existing. 
2. At page 5, Finding 19, and page 6, in the Judgment, you 
will change the commencement date of the pre-judgment interest 
from May 1, 1988 to April 1, 1989. 
If you send these documents up to me, I will sign them and 
send them back to you immediately. Then, next week, once I 
receive from you a signed Satisfaction of Judgment, I will mail to 
you (or have available if you want to send someone up here to pick 
it up) a check made out to you and your clients in the amount of 
$13,764.22. 
Very truly yours, 
WILKINS, ORITT & RONNOW 
/ / i/f 
Jeffrey R.^Oritt 
JRO:;jb S " 
cc: Jeffrey L. Gabardi, Esq. 
PEAT1.LTR 
LAW OFFICES 
W1LKINS, ORITT & R O N N O W 
SUITE 8 5 0 
TWO FIFTY S E V E N TOWERS 
2 5 7 EAST 2 0 0 SOUTH-2 
M.CHAEL J. W.LK.NS. P.C. S A L T ^ K E C , T Y ' U T A H 8 4 1 1 1 ^ 0 4 8 OF COUNSEL 
JEFFREY R. ORITT TELEPHONE A> ° ' H E A D M ^ N " J R ' 
LORIN D. RONNOW. P.C.
 ( 8 0 | , 531.7575 ROBERT S. HOWELL. P.C. 
KENDALL S. PETERSON 
DEBBIE A. ROBB FACSIMILE 
(SOU 531-7577 
September 4, 1990 
Jeffery C. Peatross, Esq. 
Ivie & Young 
4 8 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: Jackie Robertson and Craicr Robertson v. Gem Insurance 
Company 
Civil No. CV 891505 
Our File No. 740.037 
Dear Jeff: 
Enclosed please find the originals of your Amended Memorandum 
of Costs and Disbursements, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment. I appreciate your making the changes we discussed 
on the telephone last week. I note that you need to have your 
secretary sign and notarize the bottom of page 2 of your Amended 
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements before you file it. 
I will get the check from Gem on Thursday and mail it down to 
you. I would appreciate your sending me the Satisfaction of 
Judgment, signed by your clients, by return mail. 
Very truly yours, 
WILKINS, ORITT &\RONNOW 
Jeffrey R./ Oritt 
' / / • 
JR0:jb / / (/ 
cc: Jeffrey L. Gabardi, Esq. 
PEATROSS.LTR 
LAW OFFICES 
MICHAEL J. WILKINS. P.C. 
JEFFREY R. ORITT 
LORIN 0. RONNOW. P.C. 
KENDALL S. PETERSON 
DEBBIE A. ROBB 
WILKINS, ORITT & RONNOW 
SUITE 8 5 0 
TWO FIFTY S E V E N TOWERS 
257 EAST 2 0 0 S O U T H - 2 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84 I I I - 20A8 
TELEPHONE 
(80IJ 531-7575 
FACSIMILE 
I80II 531-7577 
OF COUNSEL 
A. O. HEADMAN. JR. 
ROBERT S. HOWELL. P.C. 
September 6, 1990 
Jeffery C. Peatross, Esq. 
Ivie & Young 
4 8 North University Avenue 
P. O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84 603 
Re: Jackie Robertson and Craig Robertson v. 
Company 
Civil No. CV 891505 
Our File No. 740.037 
Gem Insurance 
Dear Jeff: 
Enclosed please find a check from Gem Insurance Company made 
out to your firm and your clients in the amount of $13,764.22, in 
full payment of the Judgment that has been, or will be, entered 
against Gem in the above-referenced matter. You are authorized to 
tender this check to your clients as soon as they sign a 
Satisfaction of Judgment in your office. I would appreciate your 
sending me a copy of the executed Satisfaction of Judgment and 
filing the same with the Court. If you would rather that I file 
it, please send me the original. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
WILKINS, ORITT/-A RONNOW 
JRO:jb 
Enclosure 
cc: Jeffrey L, 
PEATROSS.LTR 
Gabardi, Esq. 
= ) 1 = = ) E = S 3 EHI t ~ = o t====j C = = = J 31- : _ J E ^ = 1 E 
GEM INSURANCE COMPANY 
P.O. BOX 449 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-0449 
TH SOUTH 4TH EAST OFFICE 
KEY BANK OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CHY. UTAH 84111 
DATE_ 
No. 02723 
09 -04 -90 
31-73 
1240' 
PAY 
TO THE 
O R D E R OF~ 
r 
L 
THE SUM 13764 Dollars and 22 Cents DOLLARS $ 1 J / / b 4 ' ^ 
•JACKIE & CRAIG ROBERTSON AND 
I V I E & YOUNG 
.ii'QO 2 7 E3»' «: i 21*000 7 3 ?•: 5 & 0 0 0 & 
ru^^ 
g l l •-• •_'JJGfafarBg 
REMITTANCE STATEMENT 
DATE 
0 9 - 0 4 - 9 0 
N U M B E R DESCRIPT ION 
CLAIMS LITIGATION JUDGEM 
ACCT. NO. 
6 1 2 0 . 0 3 
G R O S S 
A M O U N T 
1 3 7 6 4 . 2 2 
DEDUCTIONS 
0.00 
NET 
A M O U N T 
1 3 7 6 4 . 2 2 
GEM INSURANCE COMPANY 
DETACH BEFORE DEPOSITING 
ADDENDUM D 
wm vjrjcivi l iNounniNv^c/^v^ivur^viN I 
July 17, 1989 
Mountain States Ste§'l 
325 South Highway 114 
Lendon, UT 84042 
REGARDING:, 
TERMINATION DATE: 
Dear Employer: 
POLICY CS5626 
JULY 1, 1989 
We received your notice to terminate the majority of your 
employees from your group insurance policy with our company. It 
appears by your notice that your participation has dropped below the 
required level of 60%. We have cancelled your group insurance 
policy effective July 1, 1989, due to the lack of required 
participation. 
If this is not the case, we would be happy to review payroll 
information for the last three months and your current Employers 
Quarterly Wage List for possible reinstatement o the policy. This 
information must be received in our office by no later than July 31, 
1989r for review. Upon receipt of this information, we will advise 
if reinstatement is possible. If we do not receive the information 
by the date indicated, we will be unable to consider reinstatement 
of your existing policy at a later date. I have enclosed copies of 
your signed Trust Agreement and the Master Policy pertaining to 
participation for your review. 
If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me. 
Sincerely, 
CprtG i y w/7L v i e 
Manager Administrative Services 
CI/11 
cc: Gerald Nuelle, Agent 
Certified Mail: P 657 455 217 
CORPORATE OFFICE 
P.O. Box 449 / Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-044$ 
Local (801) 521 -7164 / Utah (800) 521-7164 / Customer Service (801) 521 -0099 
All States Outside of Utah 
P.O. Box 3592 / Salt Lake Citv. Utah 841 lO-TSQr 
ADDENDUM E 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 
F I L E D 
ANDREA PECXHAM, as the mother 
and natural guardian of 
KYLE M- PECXHAM, an infant; 
and ANDREA PECXHAM, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GEM STATE MUTUAL OF UTAH, a 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Plaintiffs instituted this action against Gem State Mutual of 
Utah, now known as Gem Insurance Campany ("Gem") , alleging claims 
for breach of contract; breach of duty of good faith and fair 
dealing; emotional distress and punitive damages. The defendant 
has filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the 
plaintiffs1 causes of action for breach of duty of good faith and 
fair dealing; emotional distress and punitive damages are preempted 
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 
U- S. C* §§ 1001 et seq. The defendant also contends that the 
plaintiffs are required to arbitrate the dispute and that the 
plaintiffs' remaining medical expense claims are not covered under 
the insurance policy issued by Gem. 
The court concludes that the plaintiffs' state common law tort 
and contract claims are precluded by ERISA, but additional briefs 
ROIC*T a. tXNma 
CL£R*. VI. S . 0I3TKICT <~ 
BY. 
DCFUtT 
NO. CIV-33-1513-T 
are reqirirga-n^oiir^cflG'"" par-^w^-^i tr-n-i rr-r-t ^^.—r i^^,^^.Y.m -h««u.,„ *, - — - - - „-.v^  
arbitration issue. Although it is unnecessary for the court to 
recite the complete facts as stated in both the plaintiffs' and 
defendant's briefs, the facts pertinent to the court's decision 
follow:1 
Gem created the Inter-Mountain Employers Trust ("IMET") to 
enable subscribers to the IMET to participate in group policies of 
insurance, which would be sold by Gem* Neither the original 
Declaration of Trust for IMET nor any of the amendments to the 
trust document state that the insurance policies that Gem was to 
issue would be governed by ERISA,2 All decisions regarding the 
insurance policies, including the approval or denial of insurance 
applications and the handling and resolution of claims are made by 
Gem. The various groups who subscribe to the IMET have no 
connecting relationship such as a common business, industry, or 
trade. 
AAA Engineering & Drafting, Inc. (lfAAA!f) , subscribed to the 
IMET and obtained a comprehensive major medical insurance policy 
from Gem effective August 1, 1986 for any of its employees who 
wanted coverage. Coverage was not mandatory under the policy. The 
corporate policy received by AAA does not indicate that it would 
be subject to ERISA and contains none of the disclosure 
'Although the plaintiffs purport to dispute many of the defendant's factual statements, tie critical 
facts are uncontested. 
References to tie applicability of state law found within the master policy issued to AAA and the 
arbitration amendment do not, the court concludes, conclusively establish that the program is not governed 
by ERISA. See generally Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 R2d 1367 (11th Or. 1982). 
2 
notes that AAA also has established a profit sharing plan for its 
employees, which is in accordance with ERISA. 
Andrea Peckham, one of the plaintiffs in this action and the 
mother of plaintiff Kyle Peckham, was an employee of AAA when its 
group insurance coverage underwritten by Gem became effective. At 
that time AAA was sent identification cards and benefit description 
booklets from Gem for distribution to all of its covered employees. 
AAA paid the premiums for single coverage for each of its employees 
who desired group health and life insurance coverage, including 
Mrs. Peckham, who was enrolled under a single coverage plan. The 
bookkeeper/office manager at AAA's principal office in Salt Lake 
City, Utah was AAA's liaison with Gem. Generally paper work of any 
kind concerning any employee's group health insurance benefits was 
routed through Mrs. Wilson for forwarding to Gem. 
The initial inquiry is whether or not the group policy issued 
by Gem is an "employee welfare benefit plan" and, thus, governed 
by ERISA. "Congress enacted ERISA to protect working men and women 
from abuses in the administration and investment of private 
retirement plans and employee welfare plans." Donovan v. 
Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1982). With a few 
inapplicable exceptions, ERISA applies to any employee benefit plan 
if it is established or maintained by any employer or employee 
organization engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity 
3Sec VLX supra. 
3 
affecting commerce, or Syr tropin dii • em^ o^ygp»^ «^ iil..an . ^ m^w^u 
organization. 29 U. S. C. § 1003(a). An employee benefit plan is 
defined in 29 U. S. C. § 1002: 
(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan11 
and "welfare plan" mean any plan, fund, or 
program which was heretofore or is hereafter 
established or maintained by an employer or by 
an employee organization, or by both, to the 
extent that such plan, fund, or program was 
established or is maintained for the purpose 
of providing for its participants or their 
beneficiaries, through the purchase of 
insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, 
or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in 
the event of sicJcness, accident, disability, 
death or unemployment . . . 
Consequently, under ERISA an employee welfare benefit plan or 
welfare plan is: 
(1) a ,fplan, fund, or program'1 (2) established 
or maintained (3) by an employer or by an 
employee organization, or by both (4) for the 
purpose of providing medical, surgical, 
hospital care, sickness, accident, disability, 
death ... benefits ... (5) to participants or 
their beneficiaries. 
Donovan v. Dillingham, 638 F.2d at 1371. The existence of an ERISA 
plan is a question of fact, to be answered in light of all of the 
surrounding circumstances and facts from the point of view of a 
reasonable person-, Kanne v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. , 
859 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1988) . In determining whether a plan has 
been established, a court must determine whether a reasonable 
person could ascertain the intended benefits, beneficiaries, source 
of financing and procedures for receiving benefits. Donovan v. 
Dillingham. 638 P.2d at 1373. 
It is obvious that IMET is not an ERISA plan, because the 
4 
Managers Ass'n v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 617 
(9th Cir. 1987) . However, this does not preclude a determination 
that an employer, such as AAA, who subscribed to IMET, established 
and maintained its own individual ERISA plan. The Department of 
Labor has explicitly left open this possibility, in situations when 
it has denied ERISA plan status to trusts such as IMET, in which 
unrelated employers participate. E.g., Dep't of Labor Ops. 86-08 
A (Feb. 3, 1986); 30-40 A (July 9, 1980); 79-41 A (June 29, 1979)\ 
As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Credit Managers Ass'n, an 
employer can easily establish an ERISA plan, by doing no more than 
arranging for a group-type insurance program, unless it is a mere 
advertiser who makes no contributions on behalf of its employees. 
ERISA does not require a formal, written plan. Donovan v. 
Dillingham, 633 F.2d at 1372. The purchase of a group insurance 
policy covering a class of employees does not conclusively 
establish a welfare plan, but it is substantial evidence that a 
plan has been created. Id. 
According to Department of Labor regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 
2510.3-l(j), the term employee welfare benefit plan does not 
include a group insurance program if employee participation is 
completely voluntary; the employer does not contribute premiums to 
the insurer or make a profit from the program; and the sole 
functions of the employer are, without endorsing the program, to 
'Available on WESTLAW FLB-ERISA database 
S 
premiums through payroll deductions, and to remit the premiums to 
the insurer. In this case, however, AAA contributed to the 
program by paying the insurance premiums for single coverage for 
all of its employees, AAA had provided group health insurance 
benefits to its employees for several years and the corporate 
policy handbook provided that free group medical and life insurance 
benefits would be provided to all employees. In addition, AAA 
performed certain administrative functions in connection with the 
plan, including maintaining a file containing all insurance forms 
and benefit description booklets. 
Having considered the factors set forth in Dillingham, 638 
F.2d at 1370-73 and the Department of Labor's opinion letters and 
regulations, which are entitled to considerable weight, Otto v. 
Variable Annuity Life Ins, Co,, 814 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1986), the 
court finds that the insurance program established by AAA is an 
employee welfare benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA. This 
conclusion accords with the weight of recent federal decisions. 
E.g., Brundacre-Peterson v. Compears Health Services, F.2d 
(7th Cir. 1989) ; Roe v. General American Life Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 
450 (10th Cir. 1983) ; Dodd v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
633 F. Supp. 564 (E. D. Cal. 1988) ; Davis v. Time Ins. Co. , 698 F. 
Supp. 1317 (S. D. Miss. 1983) ; Benvenuto v. Connecticut General 
Life Ins. Co.. 643 F. Supp. 87 (D. N. J. 1986); Bichsel v. Aetna 
Life Ins. Co. . No. Civ-37-885-T (W.D. Okl. Aug. 15, 1988). See 
Kanne v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d at 97-99; 
6 
F.2d at 625. 
The cases relied upon by the plaintiffs are not persuasive in 
light of Donovan v. Dillincrhan, 633 F.2d at 13 67, and its progeny. 
Significantly, the plaintiffs do not even discuss or attempt to 
distinguish the decisions cited by the defendant, which support 
the conclusion that AAA established its own single-employer welfare 
benefit plan. 
The plaintiffs do not dispute the effect that a determination 
that they were beneficiaries of an "employment welfare benefit 
plan" would have on their breach of duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, emotional distress and punitive damages claims. It is 
clear that under Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 431 U. S. 41 
(1987), the plaintiffs' state common law tort and contract claims 
are preempted. 
With respect to the plaintiffs1 remaining claim for medical 
expenses, the court must determine whether or not the dispute 
between Gem and the plaintiffs should be resolved by arbitration• 
The plaintiffs have cited Article 23, § 8 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution and 15 Okl. Stat. § 802(A) as barring the enforcement 
of the arbitration amendment, upon which Gem relies. Gem has 
responded that Utah, rather than Oklahoma law is applicable. The 
plaintiffs are directed to respond to the defendant's argument 
regarding the applicable law and the defendant is directed to 
discuss: (1) whether the Oklahoma Constitution bars enforcement of 
the arbitration clause and (2) whether, assuming Utah law is 
7 
applied, "CXIJLS u.wu.-^  w UA«-*.J w.*.w*.— —
 c 
unconstitutional under the law of.the state in which the court 
' . r 
s i t s . The p a r t i e s a re d i r e c t e d to' f i l e t h e i r supplemental b r i e f s 
wi th in t en (10) days hereof, 
IT IS SO ORDERED t h i s ^^/O/^ day of August, 1989. 
UNITED STATES QISTRICT(TUDGE 
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ADDENDUM F 
GEM INSURANCE COMPANY 
V J 
^^  
December 5, 1988 
Mountain States Steel J 
P.O. Box M 
Provo, UT 84603-0220 
Regarding: Group Number: CS5626 J 
Effective Date: November 1, 1988 
Dear Employer: 
Your application has been approved under the IMET Trust. 
Enclosed are administration materials including: Claim Forms, 
Enrollment and Waiver Forms, Change Forms, Employee Identification 
Cards and Booklets describing your coverage under your Flex-Med 
plan. We have also enclosed an Administrative Instruction page 
which explains the method of adding and terminating employees from 
your group insurance program. 
Please distribute one booklet to each of your employees and ask them 
to read each section carefully. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE SCHEDULE 
OF BENEFITS, GENERAL EXCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS AND PRE-EXISTING 
CONDITIONS BE READ BY EACH OF YOUR EMPLOYEES AND THEIR SPOUSES. 
Each new employee will receive an I.D. Card and Booklet at the time 
they enroll. 
If you or your employees have questions, please call our office at 
521-0099 or (Utah wats: 1-800-521-7164). 
We appreciate your election to insure your employees with Gem 
Insurance under the IMET Trust and we look forward to providing you 
with claims administration service which will be satisfactory to you 
and your employees. 
Thank you, 
GEM INSURANCE COMPANY 
Issue Department 
cc: Gerald Nuelle, Agent 
J 
CORPORATE OFFICE 
P.O. Box 449 / Salt Lake City, Utah 841 10-0449 
Local (801) 521 -7 164 / Utah (800) 521 -7164 / Customer Service (801) 521 -0099 
